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I.  Introduction 
Most developed nations rely on intellectual property as one of their primary tools to 
promote private investments in R&D.  An alternative approach is for the government to reward 
innovators  with  a  prize  instead  of  an  intellectual  property  right,  such  that  innovations  fall 
immediately into the public domain.  This idea dates back centuries, but over the past decade 
there has been an explosion of scholarship on the subject.  Policymakers and even the press have 
started  to  talk  about  use  prizes  as  an  alternative  to  intellectual  property  –  particularly  for 
prescription drugs. In the scholarly literature, it is generally assumed that eliminating intellectual 
property rights would result in prices closer to marginal cost, thereby reducing deadweight loss.  
The standard objection to prize proposals is that the government might offer the wrong reward 
for innovation. Scholarship on the prize system largely focuses on design mechanisms to ensure 
that the government offers appropriate rewards to innovators. 
This  article  examines  the  growing  literature  on  the  prize  system  and  reaches  several 
conclusion about the choice between intellectual property and prizes.  First, the proponents of 
the  prize  system  have  made  a  respectable  case  that  the  government  could  acquire  sufficient 
information about innovations to calculate an appropriate prize.  Several scholars have taken this 
argument too far, however, concluding that prizes are superior to intellectual property in part 
because they offer better incentives for innovation.  This argument is mistaken because any 
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mechanism to calculate rewards under a prize system could also be used to supplement or tax 
profits under intellectual property, resulting in the same outcome.   The prize system therefore 
cannot be justified as a way to improve the incentives for innovation provided by intellectual 
property.    
Second,  government  mismanagement  of  prize  payouts  may  distort  the  incentives  for 
R&D  under  a  prize  system.  There  is  a  significant  danger  that  the  government  will  try  to 
underpay innovators; and the allocation of prize money will likely be affected by pork-barrel 
politics, industry rent-seeking and bureaucratic red tape.   
Third, although prize advocates generally agree that the core justification for replacing 
intellectual property with prizes is to set consumer prices more efficiently, the existing scholarship 
glosses  over  the  likely  impact  of  prizes  on  consumer  prices.    A  prize  system  would  almost 
certainly move prices closer to marginal cost, but in some circumstances that movement would 
be only modest.  Moreover, there may be other ways of setting consumer prices near marginal 
cost without eliminating intellectual property, such as government price controls.  
Part II provides background on the choice between intellectual property and prizes.  The 
intellectual property system is designed to promote innovation by giving firms that create new 
inventions or work of authorships a temporary, exclusive right over their products.  This right 
allows them to sell their products at higher prices than would be possible in a competitive market.  
The firms can therefore appropriate a portion of the social value of their creations.  The allure of 
these profits is how the intellectual property system spurs innovation.  Once innovations have 
been created, however, the higher prices enabled by intellectual property reduce consumers’ 
access to them. The prize system is an alternative mechanism for promoting innovation that 
avoids  this  inefficiency.    Under  a  prize  system,  the  government  pays  firms  directly  for  their 
innovations instead of giving them an intellectual property right. If the government sets prize Draft 
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values equal to expected profits under intellectual property, firms would have the same incentive 
to invest in R&D, but consumers would be spared from paying high prices.  The problem with 
the prize system is that it relies on the government to set the reward for innovation, and the 
government might be poorly suited to that task.   
Part III discusses the prize system’s likely effect on the incentives for innovation.  The 
prize  literature  is  largely  devoted  to  exploring  possible  mechanisms  through  which  the 
government might calculate prize payouts.  The case for switching to prizes is bolstered by the 
intellectual property system’s own deficiencies in setting the reward for innovation, which make it 
possible  to  design  a  prize  system  that  actually  improves  the  incentives  for  innovation  while 
reducing deadweight loss.  Since the government could correct any flaws in the current reward 
for  innovation  without  eliminating  intellectual  property  (e.g.,  through  a  tax  or  subsidy  to 
innovators),  those  deficiencies  are  not  an  independent  reason  to  prefer  prizes  to  intellectual 
property.  Nonetheless, the intellectual property system’s imperfections provides the government 
with room for error if it were to set rewards under a prize system. It remains unclear whether the 
government  could  ever  be  trusted  to  implement  such  a  system.  The  prize  system  gives  the 
government total control over innovators’ profits, since government officials must appraise new 
innovations and give out rewards. At the same time, the prize system is essentially a large public-
expenditure  program  that  will  distribute  money  to  innovators  –  mostly  corporations. 
Government  programs  of  this  nature  are  vulnerable  to  a  variety  of  distortions,  including 
underpaying  many  innovators,  using  prize  funding  for  fiscal  pork,  industry  rent-seeking  and 
bureaucratic costs and delays.  
Part  III  examines  whether  a  prize  system  would  likely  improve  consumers’  access  to 
innovations that are now protected by intellectual property.  It concludes that for many types of Draft 
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innovations,  including  pharmaceuticals,  the  potential  gains  from  switching  to  prizes  may  be 
modest, and that prizes are not the only way to push prices closer to marginal cost.  
Section A of Part II discusses the inefficiencies in consumer pricing caused by intellectual 
property.    Market  forces  sometimes  help  mitigate  those  inefficiencies  through  price 
discrimination, but only to a limited extent.  There is clearly room for improvement.   
Section B of Part II examines whether eliminating intellectual property in favor of prizes 
would lessen deadweight loss by moving consumer prices closer to the optimum.  The ideal price 
for  an  innovation  is  the  marginal  costs  of  producing  that  additional  unit  of  the  good.    By 
eliminating  intellectual  property,  the  prize  system  uses  competition  to  drive  prices  toward 
marginal cost.  Prizes would likely achieve this ideal result for goods that can be disseminated as 
digital  files,  since  the  marginal  cost  of  producing  each  unit  is  effectively  zero  and,  without 
intellectual  property,  they  could  be  downloaded  for  free  from  the  Internet.    For  most  other 
goods,  the  potential  efficiency  gains  from  eliminating  intellectual  property  are  more  limited.  
Oftentimes there are other barriers to competitive pricing besides intellectual property, including 
regulatory  hurdles  and  trade  secrecy  and  know-how  in  production.    Even  assuming  perfect 
competition in the absence of intellectual property, consumer prices will still exceed marginal 
cost when there are fixed manufacturing costs and economies to scale.  Finally, there is a danger 
that the prize system would lead to allocative inefficiency by causing innovators to price their 
goods below marginal cost to boost sales volume as a way to trick the government into increasing 
its reward.  As a result, the advantages of prizes over intellectual property in setting consumer 
prices will vary according to the characteristics of the market for each innovation and the design 
of the prize system.   
Section C of Part II argues that there are ways other than prizes to push prices closer to 
marginal cost: the government can impose price controls to approximate marginal-cost pricing or Draft 
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use consumer subsidies.  Since these approaches rely on the government to set prices at marginal 
cost, their benefits depend on the information available to the government about the production 
costs of different innovations – which will often be limited.  Government price controls are safer 
when marginal cost is easily observable, such as with music and software because marginal cost is 
clearly  zero.    Also,  when  there  are  significant  barriers  to  entry  besides  intellectual  property, 
government  price  controls  might  be  the  only  way  of  lowering  prices  meaningfully  toward 
marginal cost.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  THE JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO SUPPORT R&D 
Innovation is crucial for social welfare, but in a competitive market, private investment in 
R&D tends to be inadequate.  The problem is that R&D creates an informational good, and 
when information can be copied at little cost, competitors can “free ride” off of the innovator’s 
efforts, preventing it from recouping its R&D investment. Without some way to recover their 
R&D costs, private industry will not adequately invest in innovation.    
Innovation, defined broadly as the development of new ideas and expressions, has led to 
tremendous gains in social welfare.1 The public now enjoys a constant stream of new expressions 
in the form of art, literature, music and film, all of which can possess significant entertainment 
                                                 
1  See  Bronwyn  H.  Hall  et  al.,  Measuring  the  Returns  to  R&D,  in  2  HANDBOOKS  IN  ECONOMICS: 
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 1065-1073 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010) (surveying 
the economic literature on the social returns to R&D, and concluding that the literature suggests that the 
social  return  from  R&D  is  higher  than  the  private  return,  but  acknowledging  certain  measurement 
problems);  Peter  S.  Menell  &  Suzanne  Scotchmer,  Intellectual  Property,  in  2  HANDBOOK  OF  LAW  & 
ECONOMICS 1476 (2008) (“It is now widely recognized that technological advancement and enhanced 
human capital are the principal engines of economic growth in the United States and other industrialized 
countries.”). 
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value or provide cultural enrichment.2 Innovation in the form of new ideas, and particularly new 
technologies, has been even more profound.3  Not only does technological innovation allow us to 
live significantly longer and more comfortable lives4; it also underpins long-run economic growth, 
and thus is responsible for much of the wealth of modern industrialized societies.5  
Economists  attribute  the  link  between  innovation  and  economic  growth  to  the 
nonrivalrous  nature  of  ideas.6  Unlike  human  capital  and  other  economic  goods,  ideas  are 
knowledge – an intangible asset that everyone can share.  Ideas are therefore public goods in the 
                                                 
2 See JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE _ (2d 2001).   
 
3  See  generally  Joel  Mokyr,  Long-Term  Economic  Growth  and  the  History  of  Technology,  1B  HANDBOOK  OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH  1114 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N.  Durlauf eds. 2005) (linking the Industrial 
Revolution and subsequent technological innovation with the unprecedented economic growth of modern 
industrialized societies); Paul M. Romer, Two Strategies for Economic Development: Using Ideas and Producing 
Ideas, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC 
63  (1992)  (arguing  for  the  importance  of  innovation  and  dissemination  of  “ideas”  –  rather  than  just 
technology  –  for  economic  growth).  The  literature  coming  out  of  business  schools  suggests  that  the 
development  of  new  management  structures,  operational  strategies  and  market  space  can  be  just  as 
important as technological innovation. See. Leonard L. Berry et al., Creating New Markets Through Service 
Innovation,  47  MIT  SLOAN  MANAGEMENT  REV.  56  (2006)  (analyzing  “‘market-creating  service 
innovation,’ … define[d] as an idea for a performance enhancement that customers perceive as offering a 
new benefit of sufficient appeal that it dramatically influences their behavior, as well as the behavior of 
competing companies”); Gary Hamel, The Why, What, and How of Management Innovation, 84 HARV. BUS. 
REV. 72 (2006) (arguing that “management innovation, more than any other kind of innovation, has 
allowed companies to cross new performance thresholds”); Michael Hammer, Deep Change: How Operational 
Innovation  Can  Transform  Your  Company,  82  HARV.  BUS.  REV.  84,  86  (2004)  (arguing  that  operational 
innovation  –  defined  as  “coming  up  with  entirely  new  ways  of  filling  orders,  developing  products, 
providing customer service, or doing any other activity that an enterprise performs” – was “central to 
some of the greatest success stories in recent business history, including Wal-Mart, Toyota, and Dell”). 
 
4 See Richard A. Easterlin, The Worldwide Standard of Living Since 1800, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 7, 12 
(2000) (“The qualitative change from that world [of the late 18th  century] to the current panoply of 
consumer  goods  in  the  United  States—cars  and  planes,  electrical  appliances  and  running  water, 
telecommunications and computers, pharmaceuticals and health care, and the phenomenal array of food 
and clothes—is literally incredible.”).   
 
5 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, Growth with Quality-Improving Innovations: An Integrated Framework, 
1A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 69 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds. 2005) (noting 
that “[t]echnological progress” is “the mainspring of long-run economic growth”); RICHARD R. NELSON, 
THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 31 (1996) (“Virtually all scholars of productivity growth now 
agree on the central role of technological advance.”). 
 
6 See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S73-S78 (1990). 
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technical sense of the term: their use by one person does not reduce their availability to others.7  
Since ideas can be used over and over again without diminishment, they allow for increasing 
returns to scale on the world’s finite stock of human and capital resources.8  By extracting more 
and more value out of society’s labor and capital, innovation has generated much of the world’s 
economic growth since the Industrial Revolution.9  
The  advancements  in  knowledge  that  produced  these  benefits  did  not  come  freely. 
Innovation is the product of human effort and requires the individuals’ time and resources to 
accomplish.  Proper incentives are therefore crucial.  Given that a great deal of innovation comes 
from private industry, monetary incentives are particularly important.10  
Society’s reliance on innovation and technological growth presents a challenge because, 
in a competitive market, the incentive for private actors to invest in the R&D of new ideas and 
                                                 
7  Paul  A.  Samuelson,  The  Pure  Theory  of  Public  Expenditure,  36  REV.  ECON.  &  STAT.  387,  387  (1954) 
(defining a public good as one where “each individual’s consumption of such good leads to no subtraction 
from any other individual’s consumption of that good”).  More than a century earlier, Thomas Jefferson 
offered a more elegant formulation of why information and knowledge are different from tangible goods: 
“He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights 
his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Isaac McPherson 
(Aug. 13, 1813).   
 
8  See  generally  Charles  I.  Jones,  Growth  and  Ideas,  in  1B  HANDBOOK  OF  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  1063 
(Philippe  Aghion  &  Steven  N.  Durlauf  eds.  2005)  (reviewing  the  economic  literature  about  how  the 
development of new ideas drives economic growth because ideas are nonrivalrous and therefore produce 
increasing returns to scale).  
 
9 See Mokyr, supra note 3.   
 
10 Innovation can also come from outside private industry, where non-monetary incentives sometimes 
substitute monetary ones. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE 
L.J. 369 (2002); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1068-77 (2005). At universities, for example, most 
academic researchers appear to be primarily motivated by prestige, although they still require salaries and 
funding for their research.  
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expressions tends to be inadequate.11  The problem stems from the intangibility of ideas and 
expressions, which can make it hard to prevent others from copying them.  In addition to being 
nonrivalrous, therefore, ideas and expressions tend to be non-excludable. At the same time, the 
innovative process is often expensive and risky.12  Writing a book or developing a drug usually 
requires a significant investment of time and resources, and the innovator always faces the risk 
that  the  project  will  end  as  a  technological  or  commercial  failure.  If  competitors  can  sell 
inexpensive duplicates of successful books or drugs without incurring the same costs and risks, 
price competition may prevent innovators from ever earning a return on their R&D investment. 
In a perfectly competitive market, therefore, private actors will be unwilling to invest in the 
production of new ideas and expressions that others can freely copy.13   
Natural market conditions will support some amount of private investment in R&D,14 but 
probably not enough of it. Without government intervention, therefore, society’s investments in 
                                                 
11 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE  AND 
DIRECTION  OF  INVENTIVE  ACTIVITY  _  (Richard  Nelson  ed.  1959);  Richard  R.  Nelson,  The  Simple 
Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959).   
 
12  See  F.M.  SCHERER,  NEW  PERSPECTIVES  ON  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  AND  TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION 53-88 (1999).   
 
13 See ARROW, supra note ; STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 138-140 
(2004).  This does not imply that markets free from government intervention cannot support investments 
in the production of knowledge or information – only that those investments will tend to be inadequate. 
See,  e.g.,  F.M.  SCHERER,  INDUSTRIAL  MARKET  STRUCTURE  AND  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  384 
(1973).   
 
14 Some innovations – like Coca-Cola’s secret formula – can be commercially exploited without being 
revealed to competitors, which avoids the “free-riding” problem that can deter R&D. See Coca-Cola Bottling 
Company  of  Shreveport,  Inc.  vs  Coca-Cola  Co.,  696  F.  Supp.  97,  106-109  (D.  Del.  1988)  (discussing  “the 
renowned secrecy of Merchandise 7X, ‘the ingredient that gives Coca-Cola its distinctive taste,’ … and … 
the ‘impregnable barriers which the Company … erected to protect its valuable trade secret …”). Long-
term secrecy, however, is infeasible for many types of ideas. See David J. Teece, Profits from Technological 
Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287 (1986) 
(“Usually only chemical formulas and industrial-commercial processes (e.g., cosmetics and recipes) can be 
protected as trade secrets after they’re ‘out’.”). Temporary secrecy – perhaps just during R&D before 
commercialization – can still give the innovator an important lead-time advantage in the market. Wesley 
M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Draft 
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R&D will tend to be inadequate – and perhaps significantly so.15 Economists often disagree 
about the best policies for encouraging socially valuable R&D,16 but they all seem to accept the 
need for some form of government intervention.17   
 
B.  THE  TRADITIONAL  POLICY  OPTIONS:  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  AND  GOVERNMENT 
FUNDING FOR R&D 
 
The government has a variety of different tools to promote R&D; intellectual property 
rights and government-funded R&D are two of the most important.18 Along the continuum of 
relevant policy levers, these two also lie at near opposite poles.  When the government finances 
R&D directly, it has to raise the necessary funds, select which R&D projects to finance, choose 
the researchers who will carry them out, and monitor their performance. When the government 
uses intellectual property to promote innovation, individual consumers and firms make most of 
these  decisions  through  a  highly  decentralized  process.  As  a  result,  the  intellectual  property 
system is able to harness the information held by firms and consumers to direct R&D spending, 
and it avoids some of the political economy problems associated with public expenditures.  On 
                                                                                                                                                           
Patent (or Not) _ tbl._, NBER Working Paper 7552 (2000). Moreover, after disclosing the basic idea for 
their  innovation  to  the  public,  firms  usually  maintain  an  advantage  in  the  “know-how”  required  to 
implement  it.  See  Karl  F.  Jorda,  Intellectual  Property  Valuation:  The  Legal  Counterpart/Counterpoint,  Law 
Seminars International Conference on Mining Patent Portfolios, at 4, Sept. 13, 2004. To the extent that 
firms can protect this knowledge base, they can slow down their competitors and enjoy some degree of 
market power. 
 
15 See Jones, supra note , at 1087.  
 
16 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note , at 1477-78.   
 
17 Even staunch opponents of government support for private sector R&D acknowledge that, at least in 
some cases, the government intervention is desirable. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, 
AGAINST  INTELLECTUAL  MONOPOLY  277,  292-93  (2008)  (advocating  the  abolition  of  intellectual 
property, but acknowledging that at least in the pharmaceutical industry, the government would need to 
increase public financing of clinical drug development).   
 
18 See SCOTCHMER, supra note , at 30[fix].  
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the other hand, the intellectual property system finances R&D through what amounts to an 
excise tax on innovations, which, for the provision of a public good, is less efficient than funding 
through general tax revenue.  
The intellectual property system is designed to encourage R&D investments in the private 
sector by allowing firms to appropriate some of the social surplus created by their innovations. 
Firms that create and disclose a new, useful and nonobvious invention receive a patent for their 
efforts,  which  gives  them  the  right  to  exclude  others  from  making,  using  or  selling  that 
invention.19  The authors of literary, musical, choreographic, dramatic and artistic works get 
copyrights  on  their  works,  providing  them  with  the  exclusive  right  to  reproduce,  adapt, 
distribute, and publicly display their works.20  These rights turn innovators into monopolists over 
their inventions or works of authorship.  Unless consumers have access to perfect substitutes of 
those creations, innovators can use their intellectual property rights to set prices above marginal 
cost. The revenue generated by these higher prices is the inducement for innovation under an 
intellectual property system, hopefully leading to the creation of new inventions and works of 
authorship that the public would otherwise not receive. 21   
The  problem  with  intellectual  property  is  that  it  reduces  the  public’s  access  to  new 
innovations  by  raising  prices.    Patents  and  copyrights  allow  innovators  to  set  prices  above 
marginal cost. These higher prices cause some consumers to exit the market even though they 
                                                 
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
 
20 ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 38 (6th ed. 2002).   
 
21 See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT 
OF  TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  88  (1969)  (describing  patents  as  “a  way  of  internalizing  the  external 
economies  of  knowledge”);  see  also  WILLIAM  M.  LANDES  &  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  THE  ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 375-377 (2003); SHAVELL, supra note , at .   
 Draft 
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value the innovation above its marginal cost of production.22  The result is deadweight loss. Since 
the higher prices caused by intellectual property are the mechanism through which the system 
promotes innovation, deadweight loss is often said to be an inevitable consequence of intellectual 
property  rights.23  An  additional  drawback  to  intellectual  property  is  that  it  can  encourage 
wasteful R&D due to patent races24 and duplicative innovation.25  
The  government  can  promote  innovation  without  these  problems  by  financing  R&D 
directly.  Instead of waiting for private industry to complete an R&D project and then rewarding 
the  innovator  with  an  intellectual  property  right,  the  government  can  just  hire  its  own 
researchers, or contract a private firm to do the work. This approach avoids the deadweight loss 
                                                 
22 See VARIAN, supra note , at .   
 
23 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1700 
(2008) (“[E]fficiency in use means knowledge should be freely available.  The problem is that intellectual 
property rights circumscribe the use of knowledge and thus, almost necessarily, cause inefficiency. … [I]t 
is part of our legal framework because we hope it will promote innovation.”); NORDHAUS, supra note , at 
86 (“The optimal system of production of knowledge has a price for information of zero, whereas the 
patent system ensures a nonzero price for the life of the patent.”).   
 
24 Patent races arise when rival firms compete for the exclusive rights to an innovation and only one of 
them can get it. A contest of this nature can invite strategic behavior by the competitors. Firms may find it 
profitable to increase their R&D spending in ways that improve their chances of beating the other firms to 
the patent office – e.g., by spending to accelerate their R&D.  The private value of this investment will 
sometimes exceed its social value because of its “business-stealing effect.” Under certain circumstances, 
the opportunities to gain at another firm’s expense may lead to excessive R&D spending. See Menell & 
Scotchmer, supra  note , at 1488-90. In extreme circumstances, the competition to earn a patent can 
produce a race that dissipates all expected profits. See id.; Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 
Q.J. ECON. 395 (1979); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative 
Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the 
Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, 
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).  
 
25 Duplicative innovation can occur when rival firms are competing to produce highly similar innovations, 
but the outcome of each firm’s R&D will be sufficiently distinctive to receive its own patent.  Unlike a 
patent race, therefore, this contest allows for more than one winner. Yet the result is fairly similar: to the 
extent  that  rival  firms  engage  in  R&D  that  produces  substitute  innovations,  R&D  spending  may  be 
excessive. See Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cockburn, Racing or Spilling? The Determinants of Research Productivity 
in Ethical  Drug Discovery  (1993); F.M. Scherer,  Markets and Uncertainty in Pharmaceutical Development, KSG 
Working Paper RWP07-039, at 19-21 (2007).  
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from monopoly pricing under intellectual property, and it allows the government to coordinate 
R&D activities to avert patent races and duplicative innovation.26  
There  is  a  long  history  of  government  support  for  the  arts  and  sciences,27  and  that 
support continues to this day. According to the National Science Foundation, the United States 
government spent over $100 billion on R&D in 2008.28  That investment constituted roughly one 
half  of  the  total  domestic  spending  on  research,  and  about  17%  of  domestic  spending  on 
development.29  The  government’s  direct  financial  support  for  the  arts  and  culture  is  more 
modest, but still significant – estimated to be about $3 billion in 2000.30  
                                                 
26 See Stiglitz, supra note , at 1722-24; Wright, supra note , at 692-95.  
 
27  See  MEDIEVAL  SCIENCE,  TECHNOLOGY,  AND  MEDICINE:  AN  ENCYCLOPEDIA  385-387  (THOMAS 
GLICK ET AL. eds., 2005) (attributing numerous technological advances to medieval patronage, including 
the calendar, catapults, artillery, fire arms, watermills and windmills).   
 
28  See  Mark  Boroush,  New  NSF  Estimates  Indicate  that  U.S.  R&D  Spending  Continued  to  Grow  in  2008, 
INFOBRIEF,  National  Science  Foundation,  Jan.  2010,  at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf10312/nsf10312.pdf.  According  to  the  Congressional  Budget 
Office, the United States government allocated $137 billion for R&D in 2007.  See CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED  STATES:  CONGRESSIONAL  BUDGET  OFFICE,  FEDERAL  SUPPORT  FOR  RESEARCH  AND 
DEVELOPMENT 3 (2007).  Funding allocations by agency in 2004 were as follows: 45% to the Department 
of  Defense;  28%  to  the  National  Institutes  of  Health;  8%  to  the  Department  of  Energy;  7%  to  the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 4% to the National Science Foundation; 2% to the 
Department of Agriculture; and 6% to other agencies.  Id. at xi fig. 4.   
 
29 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note _, at vii.  The precise divide between research and 
development  is  difficult  to  define,  but  the  term  “research”  generally  refers  to  projects  that  expand 
scientific  knowledge,  whereas  “development”  describes  the  application  more  generalized  scientific 
knowledge to the creation of a particular marketable product.  Id. at 10.   
 
30 See Dick Netzer, Cultural Policy: An American View, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND 
CULTURE 1235-1238 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & David Throsby eds. 2006). Most European governments 
provide significantly more direct financial support for arts and culture – measured as a percentage of their 
GDP – than does the United States.  See Frederick Van Der Ploeg, The Making of Cultural Policy: A European 
Perspective,  in  1  HANDBOOK  OF  THE  ECONOMICS  OF  ART  AND  CULTURE  1190-1193  (Victor  A. 
Ginsburgh & David Throsby eds. 2006).  In the United States, however, the government encourages 
billions of dollars in additional private donations for the arts and culture each year through the tax code. 
See Netzer, supra, at 1240.  
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There are costs associated with raising money to finance government-funded R&D, but 
compared to an intellectual property system that finances innovation through higher consumer 
prices, those costs are probably modest. When evaluating the case for government funding of a 
public good, economists traditionally consider the efficiency costs of financing the program – i.e., 
the deadweight loss from labor distortion caused by an income tax.31 Although those costs can be 
significant,32 the conventional wisdom is that the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing on 
particular goods and services is likely much worse.33 Some economists even argue that, because 
of redistributive effects and the potential for an offsetting tax adjustment, any labor-distortion 
costs from financing public goods through an income tax should be ignored.34 Under this view, 
financing innovation with general tax revenue is almost certainly preferable to monopoly pricing.   
While the benefits of funding R&D through the tax system can be significant, there are 
drawbacks to relying on the government to manage the nation’s R&D investments.35 Several 
problems  confront  government  agencies  as  they  allocate  limited  R&D  funds.  First,  the 
                                                 
31 See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in I HANDBOOK  OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 110-112 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein, eds. 1985).  
 
32 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 REV. ECON. & STUD. 
674, 677-679 (1999).   
 
33 See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note , at 54; Guell & Fischbaum, supra note , at 356 & n.1; Romer, supra 
note , at 215; Stiglitz, supra note , at 1713-1714; Wright, supra note , at 691. But see Duffy, supra note , at 46 
(“A reward system cannot be compared to IP rights without comparing the distortionary effects of patents 
and taxes. … Given that the IP right holder also has the potential constraint of competition from other 
technology,  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  the  IP  right  holder  will  cause  greater  distortions  than  the 
government's revenue agents.”). 
 
34 See KAPLOW, supra note , at (arguing that labor distortion incidental to the financing and provision of 
public goods normally should not weigh against the efficiency gains from such a program because that 
distortion could be avoided with an offsetting adjustment to the income tax, and because the costs of the 
distortion need to be measured against the corresponding redistributive benefits).   
 
35 See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 
INNOVATION  POLICY  AND  THE  ECONOMY  51  (Adam  Jaffe  et  al.  eds.  2002);  Brian  D.  Wright,  The 
Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).   
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government is sometimes poorly positioned to identify R&D projects worthy of public financing – 
particularly when good ideas are widely distributed across firms.36  The government also may 
have less information than firms about the value of R&D projects37 or be less competent at 
performing those evaluations.38 Second, the government may select the wrong firm or research 
team  to  conduct  the  R&D.39  Third,  if  the  government  cannot  adequately  monitor  the 
performance of R&D, its agents will be prone to “shirking” and waste.40 Fourth, political forces 
                                                 
36  See  SCOTCHMER,  supra  note  ,  at  38  (“Probably  the  most  important  obstacle  to  effective  public 
sponsorship is in tapping ideas for invention that are widely distributed among firms and inventors.”); cf. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT  FOR RESEARCH  AND DEVELOPMENT  13-14 
(2007) (“[S]ome observers argue that relying on peer review may favor conservative projects (providing 
only incremental progress in expanding existing knowledge) over pioneering or interdisciplinary work.”).   
 
37 See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1143-44 
(1998). 
 
38 As Stiglitz and Wallsten explain: 
 
[T]he only way to implement an incentive mechanism [for the government to fund the right 
projects] … is to include a comprehensive evaluation mechanism as part of the program.  That is, 
properly rewarding and punishing program managers is possible only if there is some way to 
detect what type of projects they fund. Evaluating technological is technically very difficult.  A 
comprehensive  evaluation  would  combine  complicated  scientific  knowledge  with  economic 
analysis under conditions of uncertainty.  In any event, as Adam Jaffe (1998) notes, technology 
programs  have  never  been  designed  with  economic  evaluation  in  mind.    Without  some 
comprehensive evaluations, public debates on these programs tend to focus on easily measurable 
private returns and easily understandable anecdotal stories of project success and failure. 
 
See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Scott J. Wallsten, Public-Private Technology Partnerships: Promises and Pitfalls, 43 AM. 
BEHAV. SCI. 52, 61 (1999). 
 
39 See Stiglitz, supra note , at 1722 (noting that one of the biggest problems with “government-funded 
research” is that “there is a group of peers (or bureaucrats)[] deciding who is the best researcher”).  
 
40 See Keith Hartley, The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE 
ECONOMICS 1162 (Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley eds. 2007) (“Generally, … moral hazard allows the 
firms to take discretionary action affecting its costs or the quality of its products (e.g., effort levels might 
not be maximized reflected in labor hoarding and ‘on-the-job’ leisure.)”); Kremer, supra note , at 1143; 
Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Private R&D Investment Response to Federal Design and Technical Competitions, 78 AM. 
ECON. REV. 550, 552 (1988); William P. Rogerson, Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 65, 70 (1994) (noting that when the Department of Defense contracts for R&D 
work, it can “find it difficult to observe and measure … the level of management commitment to a 
project, whether the best engineers are working on the project, or whether a company has a relevant 
ongoing research effort.”).   Draft 
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can distort the government’s selection of R&D projects. After reviewing several case studies of 
federally funded R&D commercialization projects, Linda Cohen and Roger Noll conclude that:  
[the] overriding lesson from the case studies is that the goal of economic efficiency—to cure 
market  failures  in  privately  sponsored  commercial  innovation—is  so  severely  constrained  by 
political forces that an effective, coherent national commercial R&D program has never been put 
in place.
41   
 
In short, the value of government-funded R&D is limited by the government’s competence in 
managing those investments.42  
  Comparing the various virtues and vices of intellectual property and government-funded 
R&D, most scholars agree that both systems serve an important role.43 In fields like defense and 
aerospace, where the government often has the foresight to identify promising R&D objectives 
and the expertise to evaluate project proposals, government-funded R&D can be a crucial tool 
for promoting innovation. In fields like film production and consumer electronics, on the other 
hand, the government seems poorly suited to make investment decisions, and the public relies on 
intellectual property.  And in fields like medicine, a mixed approach has proven to be incredibly 
productive.44  
                                                                                                                                                           
 
41  Linda  R.  Cohen  &  Roger  G.  Noll,  An  Assessment  of  R&D  Commercialization  Programs,  in  THE 
TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 378 (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll eds., 1991).   
 
42 Cf. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 13-
14 (2007) (“[S]low-growing funding for some scientific fields, the constraints some agencies place on the 
length of time research may take, and the high risk of failure are all factors in the federal government’s 
funding of fewer highly uncertain but potentially groundbreaking research projects.”); Kremer, supra note 
, at 1143 (citing various studies which found that the social return from private R&D is significantly higher 
on average than the return from public R&D investments).   
 
43 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note , at 1721-24; cf. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note , at 70 (“IP is probably the 
best mechanism for screening projects when value and cost are not observable by the sponsor, since the 
private value of IP reflects the social value, and firms automatically compare some measure of value with 
the cost of innovation.”).     
 
44  See  Wesley  M.  Cohen  et  al.,  Links  and  Impacts:  The  Influence  of  Public  Research  on  Industrial  R&D,  48 
MANAGEMENT SCI. 1 (2002); Iain M. Cockburn & Rebecca M. Henderson, Publicly Funded Science and the Draft 
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C.  THE PRIZE SYSTEM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY   
  a. The basic comparison between intellectual property and prizes.—Although most commentators 
recognize certain virtues of using intellectual property to encourage private sector R&D,45 many 
remain uncomfortable with the deadweight loss associated with the monopoly pricing it allows.  
Rather  than  accepting  this  deadweight  loss  as  a  necessary  evil  of  promoting  innovation,  a 
growing number of scholars have suggested moving to a prize system.  By rewarding innovators 
with prizes instead of intellectual property rights, the government could avoid the deadweight 
caused by patents and copyrights without needing to take direct control over private industry’s 
R&D  investments.    The  danger  of  this  approach  is  that  government  might  jeopardize  the 
incentives  for  innovation  if  it  calculates  prize  payouts  incorrectly.  In  comparing  prizes  to 
intellectual property, therefore, scholars weigh the welfare gains from reducing deadweight loss 
caused by monopoly pricing against the risk of distorting the incentives for innovation.  
The basic idea behind a prize system is that would operate much like an intellectual 
property  regime  except  that  the  government  compensates  innovators  with  prizes  instead  of 
intellectual  property  rights.46  When  firms  successfully  complete  an  R&D  project,  their 
                                                                                                                                                           
Productivity of the Pharmaceutical Industry, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et 
al. eds. 2001).   
 
45  But  see  MICHELE  BOLDRIN  &  DAVID  K.  LEVINE,  AGAINST  INTELLECTUAL  MONOPOLY  (2008) 
(arguing for the gradual abolition of intellectual property rights).   
 
46 A different approach from the one discussed here is for the government to set the prize value ex ante, 
essentially offering a bounty to any innovator who solves a specified problem in a way that satisfied certain 
posted criteria. See Davis & Davis, supra note , at 230-247 (analyzing several examples of ex ante prizes); 
Thomas  Kalil,  Prizes  for  Technological  Innovation,  The  Brookings  Institution,  Discussion  Paper  2006-08 
(2006),  at  www.hamiltonproject.org; COMMITTEE  ON  THE DESIGN  OF  AN NSF  INNOVATION PRIZE, 
NATIONAL  RESEARCH  COUNCIL,  INNOVATION  INDUCEMENT  PRIZES  AT  THE  NATIONAL  SCIENCE 
FOUNDATION (2007). Assuming that the commitment to pay is credible, these ex ante prizes would avoid 
the potential in terrorem effect of setting prizes when the innovator’s costs are already sunk. Ex ante prizes 
only work in limited circumstances, however.  The government must knows ahead of time the innovations Draft 
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innovations pass immediately into the public domain.47  Items like software and music could be 
downloaded for free;48 drugs would available as generics shortly after they enter the market;49 
and manufacturers could utilize new technologies or processes without paying a licensing fee to 
the innovators.50 To ensure that firms still invest in R&D, the government offers prizes as the 
inducement for innovation, paying firms directly in return for their contribution to society’s store 
of knowledge.   
  The appeal of a prize system is obvious.  Since it eliminates intellectual property rights, 
the  prize  system  avoids  any  deadweight  loss  from  higher  consumer  prices  associated  with 
monopoly pricing under intellectual property.51  The public would be able to freely copy the 
                                                                                                                                                           
that will be socially valuable, and it must be able to specify precise performance standards necessary for an 
innovation  to  qualify  for  the  prize.  See  Thomas  Pogge,  The  Health  Impact  Fund:  Better  Pharmaceutical 
Innovations at Much Lower Prices, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 178, 194-195 (Thomas Pogge et al., eds. 2010); Stiglitz, supra note , at 1724. 
Discussions about replacing the intellectual property system with prizes therefore focus on mechanisms 
that would allow the government to determine prize payouts ex post.  See, e.g., Penin, supra note , at 641. 
  
47 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note , at 161 (“A system that provides a fundamental alternative to property 
rights in information is one in which the state pays rewards to creators of information and then places the 
information in the public domain, making it freely available to all—so that no property rights in the 
information exist.”); Julien Penin, Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 RESEARCH POLICY 641, 
642 (2005) (“Under a system of ex post reward, innovators are paid directly by governments for their 
contributions to social welfare and their innovations pass immediately into the public domain.”).  
 
48  See  WILLIAM  W.  FISHER  III,  PROMISES  TO  KEEP:  TECHNOLOGY,  LAW,  AND  THE  FUTURE  OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004) (proposing a prize system for music and film that would replace the 
existing  system  of  copyright  protection  and  encryption  measures);  Paul  Romer,  When  Should  We  Use 
Intellectual Property Rights?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 213, 214-217 (2002) (discussing the monopoly distortions in 
the music industry caused by copyright protection, and the potential of using prizes to promote innovation 
without those distortions).     
 
49 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21.   
 
50 Cf. Penin, supra note , at 651-653 (discussing the implications of a prize system in industries where 
intellectual  property  rights  are  less  important  for  appropriating  the  returns  from  innovation  than  for 
technology trading and cross-licensing).    
 
51 See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note , at 62 (“IP and prizes can serve the same screening function, 
and can motivate firms to the same levels of effort, but prizes avoid the deadweight loss.”); Penin, supra 
note , at 645 (“[E]x post rewards increase the competition for the production and distribution of a given Draft 
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ideas  and  expressions  that  are  now  protected  with  exclusive  rights.  Competition  would  then 
reduce prices, allowing for the more efficient dissemination and utilization of innovations.52  The 
government still needs to finance the prize system with tax revenue, but just like the financing for 
government-funded R&D, this revenue source causes less distortion than the monopoly pricing 
associated with intellectual property.53  
  The prize system also avoids many of the drawbacks of relying on the government to 
manage the nation’s R&D investments.  Under a prize regime, the government does not need to 
know which R&D projects will be successful, which firms are best able to carry them out, or how 
to monitor firms as they conduct their R&D.54 It just needs to reward the firms that successfully 
produce an innovation. Although this approach prevents the government from stopping “patent 
races” and duplicative innovation by coordinating R&D investments, intellectual property has 
the same drawback.55  
  The  literature  on  prizes  also  recognizes  a  downside  to  the  system:  it  relies  on  the 
government to set the reward for innovation, not consumers. Under an intellectual property 
                                                                                                                                                           
innovation and they lead to price decrease as compared with the patent system.”); SHAVELL, supra note , 
at 162 (describing the prize system as one where, “[i]n general, due to competition, goods embodying new 
information would tend to sell at prices resembling production cost, meaning that the quantity sold tend 
toward the optimal”).  
 
52 See Barry, supra note , at 620; Chari et al., supra note , at 1 (“Prizes reward innovators while making the 
fruits of the innovation public.  Competitive markets then produce an efficient number of units of the 
good or exploit the idea associated with the innovation as efficiently as possibl[e].”); Kremer, supra note , 
at 1148 (“Deadweight losses due to monopoly pricing would be eliminated if patents were put in the 
public domain.”); Stiglitz, supra note , at 1720 (describing prizes as a way “to use the competitive market to 
ensure efficient dissemination” of knowledge) 
 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.   
 
54 See Richard G. Newell & Nathan E. Wilson, Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation 8-11 (2005); 
SCOTCHMER, supra note , at . 
 
55 See SHAVELL, supra note , at 163; Stiglitz, supra note , at 1722-1723; Deborah D. Stine, Federally Funded 
Innovation Inducement Prizes 2 (2009) Wright, supra note , at 699-700.   
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system,  the  incentive  to  invest  in  innovation  is  the  profits  from  selling  innovations  as  their 
exclusive supplier.  Assuming that consumers do not pay more for innovations than their value to 
them, intellectual property rights tie the rewards for innovation to their social value56 – albeit 
imperfectly.57  Prizes  use  the  government  to  determine  the  reward,  and  many  scholars  are 
skeptical  of  the  government’s  ability  to  estimate  the  social  value  of  innovations58  or  of  its 
trustworthiness for paying a reasonable reward.59   
Following  these  concerns,  the  literature  offers  a  simple  framework  for  evaluating  the 
choice between prizes and intellectual property: a prize system is desirable if the resulting gains 
from efficient access to innovation exceed the harm – if any – from relying on the government to 
set the reward for innovation.60 Economists widely agree that if the government could reliably 
                                                 
56 See SCOTCHMER, supra note , at .   
 
57 See infra text accompanying notes _-_.  
 
58  See,  e.g.,  JOHN  STUART  MILL,  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY:  WITH  SOME  OF  THEIR 
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 933 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909) (“[I]n general an exclusive privilege, 
one of temporary duration, is preferable [to prizes]; because it leaves nothing to any one’s discretion; 
because the reward conferred by it depends entirely upon the invention’s being found useful, and the 
greater the usefulness the greater the reward; and because it is paid by the very persons to whom the 
service is rendered, the consumers of the commodity.”); SCHERER, supra note , at 398 (“[E]stimating the 
value of inventive contributions is a difficult task, and any bureaucratic council entrusted with the job is 
bound  to  make  mistakes  and  perpetrate  inequities.”);  GEORGE  STIGLER,  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF 
INDUSTRY 124 (1983) (“The difficulties of devising even remotely objective estimates of the social value of 
pieces  of  knowledge  are  prodigious,  however.”);  JEAN  TIROLE,  THE  THEORY  OF  INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 400-401 (1988). 
 
59 See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note , at 489; Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 20 (1950) (explaining that during the patent-abolition debates in 
the mid- and late-1800s, “[t]he chief objection” to prize proposals “was that their administration would 
give rise to partiality, arbitrariness, or even corruption—the dangers of all institutions giving discretionary 
power to administrators.”); SCHERER, supra note , at 398-399; Penin, supra note , at 645 n.5.  
 
60 See Penin, supra note , at 645-646; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 530.   
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observe the social value of innovations and commit to adequate prize payouts on the basis of that 
information, prizes are superior to intellectual property.61   
  b. Resurging interest in the prize system.—The prize system is not a new idea, but economists 
paid little attention to it throughout most of the 20th century.  Intellectual property became the 
norm, and it is now a rarity to see prizes offered as a replacement for either patents or copyrights.  
Interest  in  the  prize  system  surged  over  the  past  15  years,  however,  and  scholars  are  now 
engaged  in  heated  debates  about  whether  to  eliminate  patents  on  prescription  drugs  and 
copyrights on music and books in favor of prizes.   
The idea of replacing intellectual property rights with prizes is said to be nearly as old as 
the intellectual property system itself.62 James Madison actually proposed a prize system during 
                                                 
61 See Chari et al., supra note , at 2 (“Any theory of patents as a form of intellectual property must ask why 
mechanisms cannot be devised which exploit information that will become available in the marketplace 
after the good has been innovated.”); Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note , at 62 (concluding that when “value 
is observable ex post[,] … IP should not be used at all, since prizes … can serve the same screening 
function, and can motivate firms to the same levels of effort, but prizes avoid the deadweight loss”); Hollis, 
supra note , at 3-4; Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS _ (2008) (“A unifying theme [in the prize literature] is that, if a prize giver can base the prize 
on the value of the innovation, then he should do so, and prizes may dominate intellectual property 
rights.”); NORDHAUS, supra note , at 89 (“[A] properly tailored subsidy [i.e., prize] can lower the welfare 
costs of the patent system.”); STIGLER, supra note , at 124 (“If a viable system of lump-sum grants equal to 
the contribution of a piece of knowledge to the national income (or welfare) could be devised, there would 
be a good case for using that system rather than patents.”); Wright, supra note , at 692 (explaining that if 
the “informational imbalance is resolved,” then “any rationale presented here for choosing patents over 
other incentives with lower excess burden collapses”). 
 
62 See FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW  OF  THE PATENT SYSTEM 15 (Comm. Print 
1958) (“Proposals for systems of prizes and bonuses to inventors, as alternatives to patents, are almost as 
old as the patent system.”). Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital 
Copyright?, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 95-96 (2004) (citing various champions of proposals to replace 
patents with prizes, dating as far back as 1660); CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION:  THE  ENGLISH  PATENT  SYSTEM,  1660-1800  182-200  (1988).  In  a  letter  to  Thomas 
Jefferson dated October 17, 1778, James Madison wrote:  
 
With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nusances in Government. 
But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too 
valuable to be wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the Public 
to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of it? Draft 
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the  Constitutional  Convention,63  although  it  appears  that  it  was  never  discussed,64  and  the 
delegates clearly opted for the intellectual property clause now found in the Constitution.65  In 
Europe  in  the  mid-eighteenth  century,  at  a  time  when  many  governments  were  considering 
abolishing  the  patent  system  altogether,  prizes  were  a  frequently  discussed  alternative  to  the 
patent system.66  The anti-patent movement attracted less attention in the United States at that 
time,  although  in  1886  a  congressman  actually  introduced  a  bill  in  the  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives to repeal the patent laws and establish a system of rewards for inventors.67  
                                                                                                                                                           
 
James  Madison,  Letter  to  Thomas  Jefferson,  Oct.  17,  1788,  available  at 
http://www.constitution.org/jm/17881017_tj.htm.  
 
63 See Machlup, supra note , at 15-16.   
 
64 See MAX FARRAND, ED., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, vol. II, 325 (1911) 
(quoting Madison’s proposal as to grant Congress the power “To encourage by premiums & provisions, 
the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”)   
 
65 See U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power … To promote the 
Progress of Sciences and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).   
 
66 See Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 939-941 (2002) (comparing modern 
proposals for a prize system with a proposal by Robert Andrew Macfie in 1864); Fritz Machlup & Edith 
Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 19 (1950) (“The alternatives 
most frequently recommended in lieu of patents were bonuses granted to inventors (a) by the government, 
(b) by professional associations financed through voluntary contributions by private industries, (c) by an 
intergovernmental agency, or (d) by an international association maintained through contributions from 
industries of all countries.  Proposals along these lines were discussed in the professional journals and 
conferences  almost  everywhere.”);  Steven  Shavell  &  Tanguy  Van  Ypersele,  Rewards  Versus  Intellectual 
Property  Rights,  44  J.L.  &  ECON.  525,  526  (2001)  (citing  CHRISTINE  MACLEOD,  INVENTING  THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 191-196 (1988)).   
 
67  See  Knowledge  Ecology  International,  Selected  Innovation  Prizes  and  Reward  Programs  (2008)  at  46,  at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/research_notes/kei_rn_2008_1.pdf. 
 Draft 
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Defenders  of  intellectual  property  ultimately  won  out  over  the  system’s  critics.68  
Enthusiasm for the prize system dwindled in the later part of the 1800s.69  By the turn of the 
century, economists showed little interest in the idea of replacing intellectual property with a 
prize system.70  With a few notable exceptions, the economic literature was devoid of any serious 
analysis of the prize system for most of the 20th century.71  
In practice, governments now rarely use prizes as an alternative to intellectual property,72 
leading  some  scholars  to  label  prizes  the  “neglected  innovation  incentive.”73  Although 
governments  and  private  organizations  frequently  offer  prizes  to  promote  certain  types  of 
innovation, the vast majority of these prizes are not conditioned upon innovators giving up their 
intellectual property rights.74  They simply supplement the existing intellectual property system.  
It is relatively rare for prizes to be offered as an alternative to intellectual property protection.75  
                                                 
68 Machlup & Penrose, supra note , at 19-20 (noting that although proposals to give inventors prizes 
instead of patents “were discussed in the professional journals and conferences almost everywhere” in the 
mid- and late 1800s, they “did not receive great support”); Janis, supra note , at 939-941.   
 
69 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 527.   
 
70 Id.  
 
71 Id.  
 
72  Cf.  Kremer,  supra  note  ,  at  1144-1146  (discussing  two  examples  of  patent  buy-outs  in  the  early 
nineteenth century).   
 
73  Jüri  Saar,  Prizes:  The  Neglected  Innovation  Incentive  (2006),  at 
http://innovationprizecentral.com/pdfs/prizes_the_neglected_innovation_incentive.pdf;  see  also  Shavell 
& van Ypersele, supra note , at 527.   
 
74  See  Knowledge  Ecology  International,  Selected  Innovation  Prizes  and  Reward  Programs  (2008),  at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/research_notes/kei_rn_2008_1.pdf.   
 
75 There are a few examples of prize offerings that required that the invention be placed in the public 
domain. In 1802, South Carolina purchased Eli Whitney’s patent rights on the cotton gin within the state 
for $50,000, although Whitney experienced some trouble collecting the prize.  See Kremer, supra note , at 
1145.  In 1855, the Steam-Coal Collieries’ Association at Newcastle offered a $500 pound reward for a 
“method for preventing the emission of smoke from the chimneys of multitubular boilers,” with payment 
conditional upon the absence of patent rights or certain restrictions on those rights.   See  Knowledge Draft 
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 Recently, the idea of replacing intellectual property with prizes is attracting attention 
again.  The past fifteen years have seen a virtual explosion of scholarship about prize systems,76 
particularly in economics77 and law,78 but also in political philosophy79 and medicine.80  Some of 
                                                                                                                                                           
Ecology International, supra, at 18.  In 1859, the British Horological Institute offered a reward for the 
invention of a watch that was “the best English-made going-barrel movement that can be made in fair 
trade at a moderate price” with “no patent [or] exclusive right” help upon it.  Id. at 45.  In 1931, the 
Soviet Union created an Authorship Certificate program wherein inventors could receive prizes in lieu of 
a patent, and it maintained that program until 2001.  Id. at 47-48. In 1939, France awarded the inventor 
of  photography  an  annual  pension  of  10,000  francs  in  exchange  for  his  patent  rights,  which  the 
government then devoted to the public domain (except in England). See Kremer, supra note , at 1144.  In 
1946, the United States abolished patents on inventions related to the use of atomic energy for military 
purposes, and established the U.S. Patent Compensation Board, which had authority to offer rewards for 
those inventions. See Knowledge Ecology International, supra, at 19.  In 2007, an unnamed entity posted a 
$20,000 prize on InnoCentive.com, a registry for scientific innovation prizes, for the invention of a dry-
based biolatrine along with “no patents or patent applications preventing the use of the solution.”  Id. at 
27-28.    
 
 
76 Compare Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 528 (noting that in the “[m]odern economic literature” 
as  of  2001,  “the  possibility  of  rewards  is  paid  relatively  little  attention”)  with  Knowledge  Ecology 
International,  Scholarly  and  Technical  Articles  and  Books  on  Innovation  Prizes,  at 
http://www.keionline.org/content/view/82/1  (listing  more  than  50  articles  and  books  about  prizes 
published after 2001).   
 
77 The idea of prizes is not new to economics.  See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 
61, _ (1943) (arguing, in an article published in 1943, that the patent system should be replaced with a 
prize regime).  The number of economists writing in the area has grown dramatically over the past fifteen 
years, however.  See Liam Brunt, Josh Lerner & Tom Nicholas, Inducement Prizes and Innovation, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 6917 (2008); V. V. Chari et al., Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals to Provide 
Incentives for Innovations, Working Paper (Oct. 2009), available at __; Lee Davis and Jerome Davis, How 
Effective Are Prizes as Incentives to Innovation? Evidence from Three 20th  Century Contests,  in  CONTEMPORARY 
MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION: ARE WE ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 230 (Jerome Davis et al., 
eds. 2006); JA DiMasi & HG Grabowski, Should the Patent System for New Medicines be Abolished?, 82 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 488 (2007); Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note ; Earl L. Grinols & 
James W. Henderson, Replace Pharmaceutical Patents Now, 25 PHARMACOECONOMICS 355 (2007); Robert 
C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 
213 (1995); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation, Jan. 1, 2005, at ___; Hugo 
Hopenhayn et al., Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts (2005), at __; Kremer, supra note 
; William A. Masters, Research Prizes: A Mechanism to Reward Agricultural Innovation in Low-Income Regions, 6 
AGBIOFORUM 71 (2003); Penin, supra note ; Romer, supra note ; SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION 
AND INCENTIVES 32-59 (2006); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note ; SHAVELL, supra note , at ; Stiglitz, 
supra note ; Burton A. Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, WASH. POST., Aug. 22, 2003.   
 
78  See  Michael  Abramowicz,  Copyrighted  Works  as  Public  Goods,  1  IPCENTRAL  REV.  2004,  at 
http://www.ipcentral.info/review/v1n2abramowicz.html#_edn9;  Michael  Abramowicz,  Perfecting  Patent 
Prizes, 56 VANDERBILT L. REV. 115 (2003); Jordan Barry, When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’s Poor Draft 
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this literature is more theoretical in nature, but much of it concerns specific prizes proposals for 
certain types of innovations. In particular, scholars have been debating whether to eliminate the 
copyrights on music, movies and books in favor of prizes,81 and whether prizes should replace 
drug patents to fund pharmaceutical innovation.82   
                                                                                                                                                           
Secondary  Incentives  Through  an  Optional  Patent  Purchase  System,  2007  WIS.  L.  REV.  585  (2007);  Steve  P. 
Calandrillo, An Economic  Analysis  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights:  Justifications  and  Problems  of  Exclusive  Rights, 
Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004); FISHER, supra note , at ; William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: 
Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical Perspectives (2001); Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The 
Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 106-111 (2004); FISHER, supra note ; Mark D. 
Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (200); Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy 
for a New Era,  37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS  264 (2009); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual 
Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 403-
404 (2006); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Proprietary Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
697 (2001); Marhi Kim & Bryan Schwartz, Economic Prizes: A New Model for Pharmaceutical Innovation, 6 
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 1 (2006); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government 
Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997); Jessica Litman, 
Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 41-45 (2004); James Love & Tim Hubbard, The 
Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007); Gregory N. 
Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 64-69 (2005); Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease 
Innovations for Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159 (2006); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of 
Intellectual Property: Health as a Case Study, 70 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128-130 (2007); Talha 
Syed, Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require Patent Protection for Eligibility?, IGH Discussion Paper No. 
2, June 10, 2009, at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/igh/files/DP2_Syed.pdf.; Peter K. Yu, P2P and the 
Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653 (2005).  
 
79 See Thomas Pogge, Medicines for the World: Boosting Innovation Without Obstructing Free Access, in HEALTH 
RIGHTS (Thomas Pogge & Michael J. Selgelid eds. 2010); Michael J. Selgelid, A Full-Pull Program for the 
Provision of Pharmaceuticals: Practical Issues, 1 PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS 134 (2008).   
 
80 See, e.g., Alan Lyles, Creating Alternative Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation, 28 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 
126 (2006); Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need, 13 NATURE MEDICINE 304 
(2007).   
 
81 See Abramowicz, supra note ; Eckersely, supra note ; FISHER, supra note ; Litman, supra note ; Romer, 
supra note ; Yu, supra note ; cf. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the 
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 312-315 (2002) (proposing “[s]tatutory levies 
…  on  subscriptions  for  Internet  service  and  the  sales  of  computer,  audio,  and  video  equipment”  to 
“provide a source of revenue for musicians and songwriters instead of copyright”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 
813, 852-853, 911-912 (2001) (offering a qualified endorsement of plans “to authorize private copying 
while attempting to compensate copyright owners by collecting levies on sales of the equipment and blank 
storage media that enable such copying”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Draft 
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In 2007, Senator Bernard Sanders introduced a bill into Congress that would institute a 
prize system for pharmaceuticals.83 John Edwards repeatedly discussed the idea of replacing drug 
patents with prizes during his recent presidential campaign,84 and promised to convene an expert 
panel  on  the  issue  if  elected.85  Even  the  popular  press  has  started  running  articles  about 
promoting pharmaceutical innovation with prizes instead of patents.86  
 
II.  EFFICIENT REWARDS FOR INNOVATION 
Opposition to the prize system usually stems from one basic objection: the government is 
apt to blotch prize payouts and undermine the incentives for innovation.87 It is possible that the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Free Peer-To-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 35 (2003) (proposing a “noncommercial use levy” 
for “allowing unhindered P2P file swapping while compensating copyright holders with proceeds of some 
sort of compulsory license or levy.”); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1406-1410 (2004) (discussing some of the 
pros and cons of a “levy” system for financing innovation).   
 
82 See Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues? (2004) at www.cepr.net; Barry, supra note , at 
638-640; Grinols & Henderson, supra note ; Guell & Fischbaum, supra note ; AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS 
POGGE,  THE  HEALTH  IMPACT  FUND:  MAKING  NEW  MEDICINES  ACCESSIBLE  FOR  ALL  (2008); 
Kapczynski, supra note ; Kim & Schwartz, supra note ; Kremer, supra note , at 1162-1165; Lichtman, supra 
note ; James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovations in New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 155 (2009); Outterson, supra note ; Rai, supra note ; Stiglitz, supra note ; Syed, supra note .  
 
83 Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S.2210, 110th Cong., Oct. 19, 2007.   
 
84 See Sarah Rubenstein, Edwards Pushes Prizes Over Patents for Drugs, WSJ HEALTH BLOG, Nov. 14, 2007, at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/11/14/edwards-pushes-prizes-over-patents-for-drugs/.  
 
85  Press  Release,  Edwards  Details  Cost-Savings  Measures  In  Universal  Health  Care  Plan,  June  14,  2007,  at 
http://www.johnedwards.com/news/headlines/20070614-health-care-costs.    
 
86 See Catherine Rampell, Invent a Drug, Win $1 Million, SLATE, Jan. 23, 2008; John Simons, A Radical Plan 
to  Lower  Drug  Costs,  CNNMoney.com,  Nov.  30,  2007,  at 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/28/magazines/fortune/simons_patent.fortune/index.htm;  Scott 
Woolley, Prizes Not Patents, FORBES, Apr. 18, 2006.  
 
87 See Croskery, supra note , at 639; H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 
DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852, 26  (1984) (“Patents at least let the market decide. 
‘Honours, rewards and medals’, as Charles Babbage scathingly noted, were nothing more than the ‘feeble 
expression of the sentiments of mankind’.”); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Draft 
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benefits of reducing deadweight loss would more than offset this harm,88 but considering the 
importance of innovation for economic growth,89 scholars are understandably nervous about the 
tradeoff.  As a result, the dominant view among economists seems to be that prizes are preferable 
to  intellectual  property  if  the  government  can  observe  enough  about  the  social  value  of 
innovations to offer adequate prize payouts.90  Recent scholarship on the prize systems focuses 
almost exclusively on the question of how the government could establish appropriate rewards.91  
 
A.  ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL VALUE OF INNOVATIONS TO DETERMINE THEIR PRIZE 
  The case for the prize system depends in large part on whether the government has 
sufficient information about the social value of innovations to set their reward. In the absence of 
intellectual  property,  the  government  will  always  have  limited  information  about  consumer 
                                                                                                                                                           
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 20 (1950) (explaining that during the patent-abolition debates in 
the mid- and late-1800s, “[t]he chief objection” to prize proposals “was that their administration would 
give rise to partiality, arbitrariness, or even corruption—the dangers of all institutions giving discretionary 
power to administrators.”; JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: WITH SOME OF 
THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 933 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909) (“[I]n general an exclusive 
privilege, one of temporary duration, is preferable [to prizes]; because it leaves nothing to any one’s 
discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends entirely upon the invention’s being found useful, 
and the greater the usefulness the greater the reward; and because it is paid by the very persons to whom 
the service is rendered, the consumers of the commodity.”); See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE  AND  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  398  (1970)  (“[E]stimating  the  value  of  inventive 
contributions is a difficult task, and any bureaucratic council entrusted with the job is bound to make 
mistakes and perpetrate inequities.  When inequity is inevitable, one might prefer that it be the result of an 
impersonal income distribution mechanism.”). TIROLE, supra note , at 401.   
 
88 Cf. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK (2009) (arguing that in many industries, patents often reduce the 
incentives for innovation).   
 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.   
 
90 See supra note 61.   
 
91 See Abramowicz, supra note , at 128-158 (analyzing several prize proposals); Barry, supra note , at 630-
635 (discussing various proposals for the valuation of patents); Love & Hubbard, supra note , at 1528-1534 
(discussing many of the prize proposals for pharmaceuticals).   
 Draft 
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demand. Many economists assumed that this was a fatal flaw in the prize system,92 but more 
recently, scholars demonstrated that the government does not need perfect information about 
consumer demand to set the appropriate reward.93  The government just needs to do better than 
the intellectual property system, which sets a fairly low bar.  Taking advantage of these flaws, 
advocates of the prize system have made a respectable case that the government could acquire 
enough  information  about  innovations  to  offer  prizes  that  rival  or  exceed  the  profits  under 
intellectual property as an incentive for innovation.  
  Calculating the proper reward for innovations without intellectual property presents a 
serious challenge.  The government needs to base rewards on the social value of innovations, 
which under most circumstances is impossible to measure objectively. Commercial goods are 
usually valued by way of the market, where individual consumers reveal their demand for goods 
through their purchasing decisions. This market-based process for valuing goods only works in 
the  presence  of  scarcity,  and  innovations  are  not  scarce  goods.  They  are  abstract  ideas.  
Consumers can use them without disclosing information about their willingness to pay.  The 
intellectual property system introduces artificial scarcity into the markets for innovations so that 
consumers are forced to reveal their preferences. Without intellectual property or some other 
source of artificial scarcity, the market will offer very little information about the social value of 
innovations.  
                                                 
92 See NORDHAUS, supra note , at 82 n.19 (stating that although a policy of “buying inventions at their 
social value” could “attain the optimum,” “[i]t is unlikely that [this] ideal solution[] would be feasible 
given the difficulties involved in administering [it]”); STIGLER, supra note , at 124 (“The difficulties of 
devising even remotely objective estimates of social value of pieces of knowledge are prodigious … .”).   
 
93 See Kremer, supra note , at 1140-1141; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 529-530. 
 Draft 
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Prize advocates have proposed a variety of different ways to mitigate this problem.  First 
and  foremost,  the  government  can  link  prize  payouts  to  sales  volume,94  which  discloses  the 
number  of  consumers  who  are  enjoying  the  good  and  provides  a  data  point  for  estimating 
demand.95 The government could then surmise an innovation’s social value by combining the 
sales-volume data with an estimate of the innovation’s utility to consumers96 – perhaps based on 
evidence from consumer surveys about the nature and frequency of its use,97 declared consumer 
preferences  through  voting,98  objective  evidence  of  its  utility  to  the  average  consumer,99  or 
                                                 
94 See, e.g., Grinols & Henderson, supra note , at 356 (proposing a prize system for drugs where prizes are 
based  on  “an  intertemporal  bounty  (ongoing  payment)  that  is  tied  to  market  sales”);  Shavell  &  van 
Ypersele,  supra  note  ,  at  541-542  (“[O]ne  supposes  that  the  government  could  obtain  significant 
information about demand. Most obviously, the government can base its rewards on sales data, which 
should be relatively easy to obtain … .”).  
 
95 Relying on sales figures can be more complicated when an innovation is only a small component of the 
purchased product.  See Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note , at 144 (“When inventions cannot 
be  mapped  one-to-one  onto  products,  determining  the  demand  for  any  particular  invention  may  be 
extraordinarily difficult”).  
 
96  See  Michael  Abramowicz,  Copyrighted  Works  as  Public  Goods,  1  IPCENTRAL  REV.  2004,  at 
http://www.ipcentral.info/review/v1n2abramowicz.html#_edn9. (noting that in the context of prizes for 
music,  “[d]ownload  counts  provide  just  one  of  many  means  of  assessing  the  popularity  of  different 
recordings, and while the government should be wary of relying exclusively on any single measurement 
that  might  be  manipulated  by  authors  or  publishers,  agencies  might  be  able  to  develop  reasonably 
accurate  assessments  by  considering  a  variety  of  different  proxies  and  measurement  techniques.”); 
SHAVELL, supra note , at 162 (“To give rewards that reflect the social value of information, the state might 
base the reward on the volume of use of the information, such as the sales volume … , and on some 
measure of its utility as well.”). But see FISHER, supra note , at 234 (proposing that prize payouts for music 
and movies be based only on utilization rates, not other measurements of the elasticity  of  consumer 
demand,  because  those  other  measurements  are  likely  to  be  flawed,  require  politically  controversial 
decision-making, and will tilt the incentives for innovation toward the tastes of the rich). 
 
97 See Eckersely, supra note , at 101-102, 143-150 (proposing a prize system for digital information goods 
where prize-payouts are based on each consumer’s valuation as estimated by their download count, the 
number of times they use the good (which would be monitored with software), and voluntary consumer 
voting); FISHER, supra note , at 224 (proposing a prize system for music and movies where the prizes are 
based on the frequency with which consumers listen to or watch the work); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra 
note , at 541-542 (“The government could also attempt to measure more about the demand curve than 
sales at the market price; it could estimate demand elasticities and undertake surveys to determine the 
character and frequency of use of, for example, computer software, musical recordings, and cinematic and 
television productions.”). 
 
98 Eckersely, supra note , at 101-102, 143-150.   Draft 
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observational  studies  measuring  the  social  value  it  created.100  An  alternative  strategy  is  to 
introduce a small amount of artificial scarcity into the market from which to estimate consumer 
demand – such as through an auction101 or by observing profits in a limited test market.102 All of 
these prize systems can be optional, allowing innovators to keep their intellectual property rights 
if they think the government’s prize offer is too low.103  
Each  of  these  mechanisms  has  problems,104  and  even  supporters  of  the  prize  system 
acknowledge  that  the  government  cannot  accurately  estimate  consumer  demand  without 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
99 See, e.g., Love & Hubbard, supra note , at 1536-1541 (proposing a prize system for drugs where prizes are 
largely  based  on  a  drug’s  sales  volume  and  an  estimate  of  its  therapeutic  value  compared  to  other 
available treatments).  
 
100 See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note , at 27-35 (proposing a prize system for drugs based on government 
assessments of each drug’s health impact on the population, an admittedly complicated task, that would 
be  done  by  combining  sales  volume  with  information  about  therapeutic  value  from  clinical  trials, 
epidemiological studies, and other relevant sources).  
 
101 See Kremer, supra note , at 1146-1148 & 1158-1162 (proposing a prize system wherein the government 
holds an auction to assess the value of patents where there is some small chance that the high bidder 
purchases the patent, but in all other cases the government pays the innovator double the third-highest 
bid in the auction); cf. Chari et al., supra note , at 10-15, 22-24. 
 
102 See Guell & Fischbaum, supra note , at 225 (proposing a patent buyout regime for pharmaceuticals 
through the government’s power of eminent domain, and to assist in assessing the “just compensation” for 
each patent, allowing “a market appeal” where “[t]he drug could be marketed by the firm in a specific test 
area” to observe what “the firm’s true monopoly profits [would be] had it kept the patent”).  But see 
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note , at 135 (identifying several potential problems with Guell 
and Fischbaum’s proposal for limited monopoly pricing in specific test areas, including that “it might be 
difficult to extrapolate from the results in the test market” due to “different demographics from the nation 
as a whole” and subsequent changes in consumer demand for the product). 
 
103 Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 538-539, 544 (showing an optional reward system to be superior 
to patents if the government can set prizes conservatively); see also Barry, supra note , at 635-638.  
 
104  There  have  been  a  number  of  articles  criticizing  one  or  more  of  these  prize  proposals.    See 
Abramowicz, supra note , at 127-211; Baker, supra note ;  DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note ; Duffy, supra 
note ; Kieff, supra note , at 705-717. Any effort to measure the utility of innovations will certainly be crude, 
and sometimes costly to administer. The proposals to estimate consumer demand with auctions or test 
markets would also be expensive, see Kieff, supra note , at 404, and, according to some critics, unreliable. 
See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note , at 127-211; Kieff, supra note , at 705-717. It is probably safer to calculate 
rewards based on sales volume, but this policy might encourage innovators to inflate their sales figures by 
setting prices below marginal cost. See infra text accompanying notes 210-213.  Draft 
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intellectual property.  Prize advocates are also quick to point out that the government does not 
need perfect information about consumer demand to set an appropriate reward.105 Firms invest 
in R&D based on their ex ante information about consumer demand for innovations, which is 
likely to be imperfect.  The government’s estimates of consumer demand, which occur ex post, 
only need to be as good as firms’ ex ante information.106  Additionally, because the monopoly 
profits from an innovation are always less than its social value,107 the government has room for 
error when it estimates demand.108 If the government can set prizes that come closer to the social 
value of innovations than the profits earned through intellectual property, perhaps by using sales 
volume  and  a  conservative  estimate  of  demand,  the  prize  system  could  even  enhance  the 
incentives for innovation.109  
Prize advocates also point to several other reasons why the reward for innovation under 
an intellectual property system is flawed.110 First, the profits from an intellectual property right do 
not  capture  many  of  the  externalities  of  innovation,  such  as  knowledge  spillovers  that  spur 
additional  R&D  and  innovation,111  or  an  anticommons  effect  that  deters  them.112  Second, 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
105 See, e.g., Kremer, supra note ; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note ; Stiglitz, supra note , at 1706-1709.  
 
106 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 542.   
 
107  Unless a monopolist can price discriminate with near perfection, it cannot appropriate the social 
surplus from consumers who value the good above its monopoly price, and therefore cannot appropriate 
the full social surplus created by the good.   
 
108 See Kremer, supra note , at 1140-1141; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 529-530.  
 
109 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , .  
 
110 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note , at 1706-1709.  
 
111 See Kremer, supra note , at 1141.   
 
112 See Penin, supra note , at 652-653; Stiglitz, supra note , at 1711.   
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because a firm’s profits under intellectual property are tied to the social value of its innovation 
rather than the marginal social return of its R&D investments, the reward under intellectual 
property can be excessive and cause wasteful patent racing and duplicative innovation.113 Third, 
intellectual property can offer an inadequate reward for innovations that primarily benefit the 
poor.114  This issue is thought to be particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry, where 
firms devote very little of their R&D investments to diseases like malaria and tuberculosis that 
primarily affect people who cannot afford to pay high drug prices.115  
These  various  defects  in  the  reward  for  innovation  under  intellectual  property  are 
essential to the case for the prize system, since they give the government room for error as it 
estimates consumer demand to calculate prize payouts. Even without perfect information, it is 
                                                 
113 See supra notes 24 & 25.  Some scholars have suggested that a prize system for drugs could benefit the 
public  by  deterring  the  development  of  duplicative  drug  innovations,  so-called  “me  too  drugs,” 
presumably by offering them a much lower reward, or perhaps no reward at all.  See, e.g., Kremer, supra 
note , at 1162 (“Patent buyouts could potentially increase incentives for original invention closer to their 
social value [and] reduce incentives for wasteful ‘me too’ research … .”); Stiglitz, supra note , at  21 
(suggesting that an advantage of drug prizes over patents is that “[m]e-too drugs that do no better than 
existing ones would get a small prize at best”).  Without some way to diminish the total size of the 
common pool, however, shifting profits from follow-on innovators to the first entrant will likely increase 
wasteful racing.  See Hollis, supra note , at 12.  Moreover, since most “me too” drugs are the result of 
competing firms pursuing parallel R&D paths, not the deliberate imitation of existing drugs to steal away 
their  market  share,  the  social-welfare  implications  of  shifting  profits  toward  the  first  entrant  are 
ambiguous.    See  Joseph A.  DiMasi  &  Cherie  Paquette,  The  Economics  of  Follow-On  Drug  Research  and 
Development, 22 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1, 9–10, 10 fig.4 (Supp. 2, 2004). 
 
114 See, e.g., HOLLIS & POGGE, supra ; Stiglitz, supra note , at 1720-1721.  This observation can also be 
framed as a critique of the distributive consequences of intellectual property. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note , 
at 234 (observing that “one of the great advantages of an alternative compensation system [of prizes] as 
compared to a market system” is that “[i]n the former, unlike the latter, the menu of entertainment 
products made available to the public would reflect fairly the preferences of all consumers of digital 
entertainment and would not be tilted toward the tastes of the rich, who are able and willing to pay more 
for their songs and films”).  This distributive critique is not just a call for increased funding of R&D 
projects  that  benefit  consumers  with  inadequate  purchasing  power:  it  implies  that  R&D  investments 
should be reallocated from the projects that benefit the consumers with adequate purchasing power to 
fund those other projects.  
 
115 See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., Advance Market Commitments for Vaccines Against Neglected Diseases: Estimating 
Costs and Effectiveness, 16 HEALTH ECON. 491 (2007); DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note , at 489-490.   
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possible that the government could set prize payouts that rival or exceed the performance of 
intellectual  property  in  promoting  socially  valuable  innovation.116  In  other  words,  a  well-
designed prize system could eliminate the deadweight loss from intellectual property and improve 
the incentives for innovation.  
In a recent twist in the debate, some prize advocates now argue – mistakenly – that the 
flawed reward for innovation under intellectual property is an independent reason to replace 
intellectual property rights with prizes.117  This move deemphasizes the prize system’s assumed 
superiority in static efficiency, focusing instead on the potential dynamic benefits of promoting 
innovation through prizes.118  The problem with this new argument in support of prizes is that 
the  government  could  correct  any  flaws  in  the  incentives  for  innovation  without  eliminating 
intellectual property rights.  Governments can directly tax or subsidize an innovator’s profits, 
give  supplement  prizes,119  impose  a  sales  tax  or  offer  tax  credits  on  the  purchase  of 
innovations,120  institute  price  controls,  issue  vouchers  to  consumers  with  low  purchasing 
                                                 
116 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 539.  
 
117 Joseph Stiglitz, for example, writes that “[t]he innovation incentives are strong in the patent system, 
but they are distorted, whereas the prize system can provide equivalently strong incentives that are less 
distorted.” Stiglitz, supra note  , at 1724; see also Love & Hubbard, supra note , at 160 (“The use of cash 
prizes to eliminate legal monopolies for products provides a powerful opportunity to address several flaws 
that plague the current system. In particular, policy makers would have far more freedom to design 
incentives efficiently.”). 
 
118 See Love & Hubbard, supra note , at 160.   
 
119 The United States now offers supplemental prizes to firms that develop drugs for neglected tropical 
diseases, giving them a transferable “priority review voucher” that entitles its holder to an expedited FDA 
review of any drug of its choice.  See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Priority Review Vouchers to Encourage Innovation 
for Neglected Diseases (2008). 
 
120 The various tax credits offered by the United States federal government for the purchase of energy 
efficient  products  are  an  example  of  such  a  policy.    See 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=tax_credits.tx_index.  
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power,121 or even purchase innovations directly at a price that alters the innovator’s profits. 
Indeed, any change in the reward for innovation brought about through a prize system could be 
descriptively recast as a tax or subsidy targeted at innovators with intellectual property rights.122 
It is unclear why eliminating intellectual property rights offers any advantage in the design or 
implementation of programs to change the reward for innovation.  Problems with the current 
reward through intellectual property make it more likely that a prize system would be better, but 
are not an independent justification for preferring prizes to intellectual property.   
As a result, the classic formulation of the choice between intellectual property and prizes 
remains  unchanged.    Prizes  are  assumed  to  result  in  greater  static  efficiency  through  the 
competitive pricing of innovations, but risk government error or mismanagement in setting prize 
payouts that would likely stifle future innovation.  
 
B.  THE DANGER OF GOVERNMENT MISMANAGEMENT OF THE PRIZE SYSTEM 
If a prize system is to offer rewards for innovation that preserve the incentives for R&D, 
there must be government officials to implement the system competently and without bias.  In an 
intellectual property regime, the government can allow consumers to value innovations through 
the  market,  thereby  reducing  its  own  control  over  the  incentives  for  innovation.  The  prize 
system, on the other hand, gives the government complete control over innovators’ profits by 
using government officials to appraise new innovations and hand out rewards.  The incentives for 
                                                 
121  Prescription-drug  insurance  through  Medicaid  is  a  targeted  consumer  subsidy  that  increases  the 
incentive to develop treatments for disabilities – like Schizophrenia – that disproportionately affect people 
with  or  cause  them  to  have  low  purchasing  power.    To  the  extent  that  the  government  wants  to 
counteract  the  uneven  incentives  for  innovation  caused  by  unequal  distribution  of  income,  targeted 
consumer subsidies are the most direct approach to the problem, although they may not be feasible in all 
cases.   
 
122 Although there could be logistical or administrative reasons why it is easier to alter industry profits in 
the absence of intellectual property rights, none have been offered.  
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innovation  could  therefore  be  distorted  by  the  self-interest  or  incompetence  of  government 
officials who control prize payouts. At its core, the prize system is a large public-expenditure 
program.  The government would need to raise tremendous sums money from taxpayers, and 
then distribute that money to innovators – most of which would be corporations. Government 
programs of this nature are vulnerable to a predictable set of distortions.  Government officials 
may sometimes just appropriate a firm’s innovation or offer minimal compensation.  At the same 
time, the pressures of pork-barrel politics, industry rent-seeking and bureaucratic red tape will all 
affect  the  prize  system  to  one  degree  or  another.    If  the  government’s  track  record  with 
procurement spending is any guide, these distortions could be significant.  
When  the  government  relies  on  intellectual  property  alone  to  set  the  reward  for 
innovation, it limits its own control over that reward by allowing consumers to determine the 
value of new inventions. Firms must sell their innovations to consumers to earn a profit, and 
consumers decide what they are willing to pay. Although the government controls firms’ ability 
to set prices through its control over their intellectual property rights, once those rights are in 
place, the profits from innovation depend on consumer demand. For many scholars, this process 
of  valuing  innovations  through  the  market  instead  of  through  the  government  is  one  of  the 
intellectual property system’s primary virtues.123  
In contrast, the prize system requires the government to take complete control over the 
reward for innovation. As with intellectual property, the government must start by defining each 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION, 1750-1852, 26  (1984) (“Patents at least let the market decide. ‘Honours, rewards and 
medals’, as Charles Babbage scathingly noted, were nothing more than the ‘feeble expression of the 
sentiments of mankind’”); Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1477 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds. 2007) (“Since the private 
value of the invention [protected by intellectual property] generally reflects the social value, inventors 
should be willing to bear higher costs for inventions of higher value.  The intellectual property mechanism 
encourages inventors to weed out their bad ideas.”).   
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new innovation to know what the public has been given – the equivalent of setting the scope of a 
patent or copyright. Rather than allowing consumers to determine the value of that innovation, 
however, a prize regime requires the government to make that decision, appraising each new 
innovation and then handing out the reward.  As a result, the government exercises complete 
control over innovators’ profits.124 
Since the prize system relies on the government to measure the value of innovations and 
set rewards, politics could affect prize payouts. The literature on prize proposals mostly focuses 
on  how  the  government  could  acquire  enough  information  about  inventions  to  set  an 
appropriate reward,125 but a prize system needs more than just information to be effective. It 
requires government officials who will design and implement the system properly, such that the 
rewards for innovation are not overly distorted by rent-seeking and political interference.  The 
motives and competence of the government officials that control prize payouts, along with the 
opportunities for rent-seeking, could all have an important effect on the outcome of the system.126   
The most pressing concern with the prize system is that government officials will take 
advantage of their position to grossly underpay innovators,127 who may have little choice but to 
                                                 
124 If the government were to use other channels in addition to intellectual property to affect innovators’ 
profits (such as taxes and subsidies), it could exercise this same degree of control over the reward for 
innovation. Under an intellectual-property regime, however, the government has the option of relying on 
consumers to determine the value of innovations through the market. That choice is not available to the 
government under a prize system.  
 
125 See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note , at  301, 339-340, 348-350; Chari et al., supra note ; Eckersley, supra 
note ; HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note ; Kremer, supra note ; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note. 
 
126 See Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note , at 146-147 (observing that even if “economic science 
provides tools that the government might use to determine appropriate rewards, that does not show that 
the government in fact will do a good job of using those tools” because “government officials charged with 
the task might make various errors” or be biased by “their [personal] motivations”).  
 
127 See, e.g., DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note , at 489 (“The temptation for legislators and administrators to 
undervalue innovations is especially great for prize awards.  Government budgetary pressures combined 
with the appearance of windfall profits to pharmaceutical firms for medical advances would contribute to Draft 
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accept an insufficient reward because their innovation already exists and their costs are sunk.128  
By lowering the payout, legislators could take credit for being fiscally responsible or redirect 
funds to projects that bring them immediate political gain.129  Eventually the public would suffer 
from the reduced output of socially valuable innovation, but this malfeasance would be largely 
hidden because it is hard to observe the absence of new innovations compared to what would 
have been available if rewards were greater.130  Political pressure alone seems unlikely to result in 
adequate payments to innovators.  The most promising solution to this problem is to make prizes 
optional, since innovators will refuse to give up their intellectual property right if the prize is less 
than what they expect to earn through a monopoly.131 This strategy does not work, however, 
                                                                                                                                                           
uncertainties about constraints on the size of prize awards.”); SCHERER, supra note , at 399 (arguing that 
“there is an inherent conservative bias in the prizes granted by administrative and quasi-judicial bodies”); 
Jean Tirole, Intellectual Property and Health in Developing Countries, in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 313 (A. 
Banerjee et al. eds. 2005) (“The patent system, for all its flaws, has the major benefit that its market-based 
reward approach is not subject to the two rocks that bureaucratic procedures usually strike: capture and 
overpayment, and opportunistic expropriation and underpayment.”).Wright, supra note , at 703 (“There is 
an additional moral hazard problem from the viewpoint of researchers, in that the government may 
understate its ex post evaluation if it wishes to minimize expenditures, and is not greatly concerned with 
the effects of such action on the reputation of future governments.”).  
 
128 See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note , at 489.   
 
129 See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and 
Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 198 (2001) (noting “the possibility that fiscal 
pressures  might  lead  the  government  to  underestimate  the  profit  figure,  thereby  deterring  future 
investment in research”).   
 
130 Cf. Wright, supra note , at 703 (“There is an additional moral hazard problem from the viewpoint of 
researchers,  in  that  the  government  may  understate  its  ex  post  evaluation  if  it  wishes  to  minimize 
expenditures, and is not greatly concerned with the effects of such action on the reputation of future 
governments.”).   
 
131 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 544 (“The optional reward system … has the practical, 
political advantage that industry should not object to it, as it can only raise firms’ profits.  Moreover, the 
fear that government would act suboptimally, and give unduly conservative rewards, would be less of an 
issue under an optional reward scheme because innovators can always obtain intellectual property rights.  
Indeed, just because of innovators’ option, the government’s temptation to pay too little might be checked 
under an optional reward system.”) 
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when the government can exercise control over the market for the innovation,132 as is generally 
true for innovations related to health care.133    
  While the goal of a prize system is to set reward payments based on the social value of 
innovations, elected officials may be just as interested in where that money is being spent.134  
Legislators  frequently  exhibit  a  strong  preference  for  public  expenditures  directed  to  their 
constituents.135 The narrow political interests of elected officials often have a significant affect on 
agency spending,136 including programs involving R&D expenditures.137 In several cases, the 
misallocation of resources due to pork-barrel politics and other narrow political interests was so 
                                                 
132  The Soviet Union’s prize system was technically optional in nature,  but  because  the  government 
controlled the market and the patentability standards, innovators reportedly had little choice but to accept 
whatever prize they were offered.  See W A Van Caenegem, Inventions in Russia: From Public Good to Private 
Property, 4 AUSTRALIAN INTELL. PROP. J. 232, 233 (1993). 
 
133 See infra note 208.   
 
134 See McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1687 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell eds., 2007. 
 
135 See Anthony M. Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy, 
71 J. POL. 926, 927 n.2 (2009) (citing numerous studies about how elected officials direct government 
grants to their constituents).  
 
136  See  Christopher  R.  Berry  &  Jacob  E.  Gersen,  Agency  Spending  and  Political  Control  of  the  Bureaucracy, 
(forthcoming) (2010); Christopher R. Berry et al., The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending 2, at 
https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/bcburden/web/bbh2010.pdf  (finding  that  districts  receive  more  money 
when they are represented by members of the President’s party); Bertelli & Grose, supra note _, at 926 
(finding that agencies allocate additional money to states with senators with a similar party affiliation to 
that of the agency); Scott E. Carrell & Janice A. Hauge, Politics and the Implementation of Public Policy: the Case 
of the US Military Housing Allowance Program, 138 PUB. CHOICE 367, 368 (2009) (“It is widely accepted that 
politics play a role in federal spending.”).  
 
137 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Scott J. Wallsten, Public-Private Technology Partnerships: Promises and Pitfalls, 43 AM. 
BEHAV. SCI. 52, 61 (1999). Using more delicate language to make the same point, the Congressional 
Budget  Office  reports  that  one  problem  with  federal  R&D  expenditures  is  that  “[c]oncerns  about 
geographic  fairness  in  allocating  federal  funds  may  motivate  some  awards  for  R&D  projects.” 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT  FOR RESEARCH  AND DEVELOPMENT  14-15 
(2007). 
 Draft 
Please do not cite without permission from the author. 
  38 
severe that it undermined entire R&D programs.138 The intellectual property system, on the 
other hand, is fairly resistant to this type of political distortion.  Elected officials rarely use the 
patent or copyright laws to single out particular innovators for special treatment.139 It is possible 
that elected officials would show the same degree of restraint with prize payouts.140 However, 
since  Congress  would  be  responsible  for  financing  the  prize  system  and  control  its  budget, 
legislators may feel entitled (or even obligated) to exert influence over the allocation of prize 
money.  
Industry rent-seeking could present an even greater threat to a prize system’s effectiveness 
at promoting innovation.141 Handing out monetary prizes to innovators will encourage firms to 
invest in R&D, but firms will also look for other ways to capture that money. With government 
officials in charge of appraising their innovations, firms may try to influence those decisions 
through  any  number  of  strategies,  including  simple  persuasion,  campaign  contributions, 
developing  personal  relationships  with  the  decision-makers,  and  revolving-door  hiring.142  If 
                                                 
138 See Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Government Support for Commercial R&D, in THE TECHNOLOGY 
PORK BARREL _ (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, eds. 1991).  
 
139 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note , at 204-205.   
 
140 See Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note , at 210-211 (arguing that because “it is rare for a 
company to lobby Congress to enact legislation extending a patent term, … probably because legislators 
view the patent system as the exclusive means of obtaining monopoly power in exchange for innovation,” 
“prize systems similarly might escape the most blatant rent-seeking abuses”).  
 
141 See Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, _ B.U.J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. _ (2007).  
 
142  See  Jeffrey  S.  Banks  et  al.,  The  Politics  of  Commercial  R&D  Programs,  in  THE  TECHNOLOGY  PORK 
BARREL 67-71 (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll eds., 1991) (describing the various ways in which – and 
reasons why – agency officials develop personal relationships with industry officials that bias the agency 
officials’ judgments and distort the flow of government resources); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This 
“Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 485, 523-524 (2008) (describing some 
of the ways that interest groups influence legislators, including by “convinc[ing] a legislator … to shift 
those preferences to better align with the group’s preferences,” “provid[ing] needed campaign financing 
and reelection support,” and “providing lavish gifts, lucrative honoraria, desirable social connections, 
comfortable  post-government  service  positions,  and  even  pleasant  companionship”);  John  Lehman, Draft 
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some  firms  are  more  effective  than  others  at  inflating  their  prize  payouts,  their  rent-seeking 
activities will distort private R&D investments.143  
The intellectual property system is also vulnerable to rent-seeking,144 but switching to the 
prize system would likely exacerbate these problems, and perhaps significantly so. Government 
officials  can  affect  an  innovator’s  profits  through  the  intellectual  property  system  only  by 
manipulating the scope or duration of its monopoly rights. The prize system would open up a 
new – and much more direct – avenue through which government officials could control the flow 
of money to innovators: the process of appraising innovations and handing out rewards. Moving 
                                                                                                                                                           
Wasteful Defense Spending Is a Clear and Present Danger,  WALL  ST.  J.,  Jul.  18,  2009  (“All  too  frequently, 
procurement officers have become de facto out-placement offices for retiring officers seeking employment 
in the defense industry.”).   
 
143 See Kremer, supra note , at 1139.  
 
144 Since Congress writes the intellectual property laws, those rules are subject to the normal distortions of 
the democratic process. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 
N.C.L. REV. 1342, 1346 (2009) (finding that “diverse economic and political groups with a stake in the 
functioning of the patent system influence and shape congressional legislation and determine the direction 
and scope of the proposed reforms”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. 
L. REV. 275, 359 (1989) (arguing that each time Congress revises the copyright laws, it “rel[ies] on current 
stakeholders to agree on a statutory scheme, [and] they produce a scheme designed to protect themselves 
against the rest of us”). On the other hand, Congress rarely intervenes in individual patent and copyright 
disputes. The intellectual property laws consist mostly of generalized rules that apply to large numbers of 
potential  innovators,  which  makes  it  difficult  for  legislators  to  single  out  particular  firms  for  special 
treatment through the intellectual property system.  See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note , at 204-205 (noting 
that with intellectual property, “there is always pressure [by firms] for special treatment,” but “[t]his kind 
of shenanigans would likely be much worse in a world in which it was broadly accepted that differential 
patents for different technologies were appropriate”); Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. 
LAW. 44, 47-49 (2008) (expressing concern about proposals to write industry-specific patent laws into the 
statute).  The PTO is responsible for granting patents to inventors (although its decisions are subject to de 
novo review by the courts).  The agency “is not free from political influence,” Kesan & Gallo, supra at 1333-
34, but its role is usually thought of as ministerial, see Jonathan S. Mazur, Process as Purpose: Costly Screens, 
Value Asymmetries, and Examination at the Patent Office, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming), and the PTO is 
rarely accused of handing out individual favors.  In both the patent and copyright systems, the judiciary 
makes  the  case-by-case  determinations  that  affect  innovators’  profits.  See  AGREEMENT  ON  TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS), Art. 41 ¶¶ 4 & 5 (requiring that all 
signatory nations allow for enforcement of intellectual property rights through a judicial system).  Those 
decisions, of course, are vulnerable to distortion by special interests. See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group 
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).  
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to a prize regime would also change the dynamics of industry rent-seeking. Instead of lobbying 
for rents in an adversarial setting, where the interested parties are present to contest any transfer 
of wealth, innovators would be lobbying the government for taxpayer dollars. In sum, the prize 
system creates a more direct channel for industry rent-seeking while also making the system more 
vulnerable to manipulation by special interests.  
Although this invitation to rent-seeking poses a real danger, an equal threat may come 
from the public’s efforts to prevent that rent-seeking.145 Attempts to restrain discretion in agency 
spending to prevent fraud, waste and abuse often result in a spiral of bureaucratic controls that 
can do more harm than good.146 If the U.S. government’s experience with defense contracting 
and government procurement spending portends the future of a prize system, then the problems 
of fiscal pork, rent-seeking and overly-burdensome bureaucracies will all plague the system.147   
                                                 
145 Cf. Keith Hartley, The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE 
ECONOMICS 1140, 1166 (Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley eds., 2007) (“Arms procurement involves public 
interest issues, with taxpayer’s representatives concerned about the efficiency and profitability of arms 
contracts.  The result has been the creation of regulatory regimes to monitor arms contracts, contractors 
and procurement agencies.”).  
 
146 See, e.g., JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 482 (1999) (“The President’s 
Commission on Government Procurement discovered in 1969 that a typical contracting officer in one 
echelon of DOD had to consult over five linear feet of procurement regulations and instructions to guide a 
constrict his activities.”); id. at 506-507 (“A 1992 study … found that acquisition laws represented the apex 
of  a  ‘cascading  pyramid’  of  stricter  regulations,  overly-detailed  military  specifications,  and  common 
procurement practices that typically added 30 percent to 50 percent of the costs of doing business with the 
Department of Defense.”); Steven Kelman, Remaking Federal Procurement, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 581, 595-596 
(2002)  (describing  how  the  procurement  procedures  became  mired  in  red  tape  and  complicated 
bureaucratic regulations that “slowed the system down enormously, so that buying products or services 
took far longer than in the private sector and following the rules took up much of the time of contracting 
officials”). 
 
147 See John Lehman, Wasteful Defense Spending Is a Clear and Present Danger, WALL ST. J., Jul. 18, 2009 
(“Because of lack of competition early in programs, there has been a serious decline in technological and 
engineering innovation.  And costs have gone up steadily in mature production programs because of the 
absence of competition.  There is also the revolving door problem. … All too frequently, procurement 
officers have become de facto out-placement offices for retiring officers seeking employment in the defense 
industry.”); Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 56-59 
(1993) (noting the record of widespread waste and abuse by Superfund contractors selected by the EPA); 
JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 446 (1999) (“[A]s symbols of modern Draft 
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The  likelihood  that  the  government  will  mismanage  prize  payouts  is  a  significant 
drawback to the prize system. It is possible that the benefits of eliminating intellectual property 
still  outweigh  the  costs  of  some  government  mismanagement  under  a  prize  system.  Those 
possible benefits are addressed in the following section.   
   
III.  EFFICIENT CONSUMER PRICES FOR INNOVATION 
 
The justification for promoting innovation with prizes instead of intellectual property is, 
and  must  be,  that  prizes  will  reduce  deadweight  loss  by  bringing  consumer  prices  closer  to 
marginal  cost.148  Interesting,  the  prize  literature  largely  ignores  the  question  of  whether 
eliminating  intellectual  property  would  actually  result  in  more  efficient  pricing.  Much  of  it 
assumes,  often  explicitly,  that  prices  will  fall  to  marginal  cost  under  a  prize  system,  thereby 
eliminating  any  deadweight  loss  from  monopoly  pricing.149  Despite  the  recent  surge  of 
                                                                                                                                                           
contracting, I would not choose a procurement item such as a computer or a sophisticated machine of 
war.  Nor would I choose a $400 hammer or a $7,000 coffee pot.  These are merely the latest in a long 
history  of  embarrassments.    Instead,  I  would  choose  the  sea  of  statues,  regulations,  and  paperwork 
inundating  the  process,  providing  flotation  for  an  infinite  number  of  lawsuits  relied  upon  as  life 
preservers.”);  Lani  A.  Perlman,  Guarding  the  Government’s  Coffers:  The  Need  for  Competition  Requirements  to 
Safeguard Federal Government Procurement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3187, 3232 (2007) (“From the Department’s 
inception, DHS procurement has been plagued by the very ills that competitive bidding is designed to 
guard against: waste, fraud, and abuse.”); Jennifer Jo Snider Smith, Competition and Transparency: What 
Works  for  Public  Procurement  Reform,  38  PUB.  CONT.  L.J.  85,  94  (2008)  (describing  how  the  increased 
discretion given to government officials in their procurement orders made it “too easy for agencies to use 
their ‘preferred companies,’ resulting in less competition, and this increased waste, cost, and fraud.  This 
was  confirmed  by  audits.”);  id.  at  117  (quoting  Scott  Amey,  the  general  counsel  of  the  Project  on 
Government Oversight, as saying that “[c]urrently, there is widespread evidence of waste, fraud and 
abuse in federal contracting.”) 
 
148 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 530 (“[T]he reward system is superior to patent in that 
deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing is avoided under rewards.”).  
 
149 See BAKER, supra note , at 17 (“The key feature that all four of these [prize] proposals have in common 
is that they largely eliminate the gap between price and marginal cost that is created by the current patent 
system.”); Calandrillo, supra note , at 326-328, 336-337 (“Once the award is given, the innovation falls into 
the public domain such that it can be reproduced without penalty and distributed to all those whose 
willingness to pay is equal to or exceeds the marginal cost of production.”); Chari et al., supra note , at 1 
(“Prizes reward innovators while making the fruits of the innovation public.  Competitive markets then Draft 
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scholarship on prizes,150 there has been no systematic analysis of the prize system’s likely effects 
on consumer prices. This gap in the literature leaves a significant hole in the case for the prize 
system. Scholars may have overlooked this question because, given normal market conditions, it 
is perfectly reasonable to assume that eliminating intellectual property will prevent at least some 
amount of deadweight loss.  Yet the benefits of the prize system might be much smaller than 
currently imagined.  
The advantage of the prize system is that it eliminates any deadweight loss caused by 
intellectual property.  Any welfare gains under the prize system therefore depend on the amount 
of deadweight loss that can be attributed to the intellectual property system.  Price discrimination 
can – and does – alleviate the problems associated with monopoly pricing to a certain extent, 
thereby reducing the value of switching to prizes.  Although some deadweight loss is inevitable 
because price discrimination is never perfect, much of it might persist even in the absence of 
intellectual  property.  Numerous  barriers  to  entry  would  remain  in  the  markets  for  many 
innovations, including barriers like trade secrecy, advantages in know-how, regulatory hurdles, 
and any large fixed production costs.  Moreover, the prize system could introduce its own pricing 
distortions. Prize system would probably still reduce overall deadweight loss to some extent, but 
those improvements may be quite modest in many markets. In light of these limitations to the 
                                                                                                                                                           
produce an efficient number of units of the good or exploit the idea associated with the innovation as 
efficiently  as  possibl[e].”);  Patricia  M.  Danzon  &  Adrian  Towse,  Differential  Pricing  for  Pharmaceuticals: 
Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE & ECON. 183, 185 (2003); Michael 
Kremer,  Patent  Buyouts:  A  Mechanism  for  Encouraging  Innovation,  113  Q.J.  ECON.  1137,  1148  (1998) 
(“Deadweight  losses  due  to  monopoly  pricing  would  be  eliminated  if  patents  were  put  in  the  public 
domain.”); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 529 (stating their assumption of “no deadweight loss 
from monopoly pricing” in their model of the prize system); Stiglitz, supra note , at 1279 (“The power of 
competitive markets would ensure a wide distribution [of drugs] at the lowest possible price, unlike the 
current system, which uses monopoly power, with its high prices and limited usage.”).  
 
150 See supra notes _-_.   
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prize system, it is possible that the government could use other policies to more effectively reduce 
deadweight loss, such as price controls or subsidies for consumer purchases.  
 
A.  DEADWEIGHT LOSS FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE MITIGATING EFFECTS OF 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
  While difficult to measure, many intellectual property rights probably cause at least some 
deadweight loss – and perhaps a great deal of it. Firms can reduce these harms by offering 
discounts to consumers who otherwise would exit the market due to monopoly pricing.  The 
intellectual property literature recognizes the prevalence of price discrimination, but overlooks 
some of the most important occurrences of it.  Prescription-drug insurance, various patent pools, 
and online subscription fees all follow a “two-part tariff” pricing model, which can dramatically 
reduce deadweight loss for some consumers. Since price discrimination is never perfect, some 
deadweight loss persists. As a result, there is almost always room for a prize system to benefit the 
public.  In markets where beneficial price discrimination is the norm, however, there is less to 
gain from switching to prizes.  
  Intellectual  property  has  a  significant  drawback:  it  promotes  innovation  by  forcing 
consumers  to  pay  higher  prices.  The  resulting  deadweight  loss  is  considered  the  intellectual 
property system’s greatest vice.151 At the same time, intellectual property rights rarely translate 
into a pure monopoly.152  Consumers usually have access to imperfect substitute goods, which 
                                                 
151 See, e.g., NORDHAUS, supra note , at 86 (“[T]he patent system can never be an optimal system of 
encouraging  technological  change  for  it  involves  deadweight  loss.”);  SCHERER,  supra  note  ,  at  382 
(explaining  that  for  the  benefit  of  stimulating  innovation  through  patents,  “society  pays  a  price:  the 
monopoly power conferred by patent grants”); SCOTCHMER, supra note , at 37 (“Deadweight loss is the 
main defect of intellectual property as an incentive mechanism.”); SHAVELL, supra note , at 142.    
 
152 Based on surveys of industry executives, many patents are reported to be ineffective at preventing 
competitors from duplicating the covered technology. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual 
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) _ tbl._, NBER Working Paper 
7552 (2000).  Draft 
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prevents  innovators  from  pricing  like  a  true  monopolist.153  To  the  extent  that  intellectual 
property leads to monopolistic competition or oligopolies, however, it still causes prices to rise 
above marginal cost, and therefore still results in static inefficiency.154  In industries where the 
difference between marginal cost and prices under intellectual property are significant, such as 
software  and  pharmaceuticals,  the  deadweight  loss  caused  by  intellectual  property  might  be 
severe.155   
Markets can mitigate this problem if firms are able to offer discounts to consumers who 
are  unwilling  to  pay  the  monopoly  price.156  Every  consumer  who  values  a  good  above  its 
marginal cost but below the monopoly price represents a potentially profitable transaction for its 
producer.  If the firm can continue to charge an elevated price to most consumers while offering 
discounts to ones who are unwilling to pay the fully monopoly price, it can avoid the deadweight 
loss from monopoly pricing.157  Price discrimination of this sort, if perfectly implemented, would 
eliminate the static inefficiency associated with intellectual property.158  
                                                                                                                                                           
 
153 See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-1738 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 996 n.26 (1997). 
 
154 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note , at 375-377; SCHERER, supra note , at 390-391.   
 
155 See Kremer, supra note , at 1140; SCHERER, supra note , at 390 (describing patented pharmaceuticals as 
an “extreme” case of where patents confer significant market power); Stiglitz, supra note , at 1701.  
 
156 Fisher, supra note , at 14-16; SCOTCHMER, supra note _, at 37.  
 
157 See Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
2221, 2226 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter, eds. 2007).   
 
158 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 
727-732 (2001) (arguing that “[c]oncerns about dead-weight loss do not provide a proper motivation for 
seeking alternatives to the system” because “[t]he ability to price discriminate gives the patentee incentive 
to elect not to restrict output … .”). 
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While the standard account of intellectual property in the economic literature recognizes 
price discrimination as a potential solution to static inefficiency, it also observes that this type of 
price  discrimination  is  often  difficult  to  implement,  and  that  perfect  price  discrimination  is 
usually impossible.159  There are two major hurdles to discriminatory pricing.  First, firms need a 
way to identify consumers who are unwilling to pay the monopoly price so that they can offer 
them a discount.  Since all consumers prefer a lower price, firms cannot identify the ones who 
need a lower price merely by asking.160  They can charge different prices based on the quantity 
or quality of goods purchased, which may help sort consumers according their willingness to pay, 
or they can offer discounts to consumers based on observable characteristics that are associated 
with a weaker demand for the product.161  Both strategies can be costly, and they are almost 
always  imperfect  sorting  devices.162  Second,  firms  must  be  able  to  stop  the  consumers  who 
receive discounts from reselling the good to the consumers who are willing to pay the full price.163 
                                                 
159 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note , at 40 (explaining that although “perfect price discrimination 
… would produce the competitive output,” “the information about consumer demands that would be 
required in order to be able to practice perfect price discrimination is not obtainable at any cost that 
would make it worthwhile.”); Lichtman, supra note , at 133 n.25; see also Rai, supra note , at 188 (describing 
perfect price discrimination in the pharmaceutical industry as “unfeasible” because of “the administrative 
costs of gathering accurate willingness-to-pay information, and the difficulty of restricting resale among 
purchasers”);  SCOTCHMER,  supra  note  ,  at  37  (“Price  discrimination  can  go  a  long  distance  toward 
redressing the inefficiency of deadweight loss, but it is hard to implement.”).  
 
160 Fisher, Differential Pricing of Information, supra note , at 3-4; SCOTCHMER, supra note , at 37-38; TIROLE, 
supra note , at 137. 
 
161 See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 69-75 (2001). 
 
162 See Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, Costly Price Discrimination, 99 ECON. LETTERS 206 (2008). 
Certain pricing schemes, such as second-degree price discrimination involving quality differentiation, can 
sometimes reduce total social surplus. See Meurer, supra note , at 71-80.   
 
163 Supra note 160.    
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There are often practical and legal difficulties with barring consumers from reselling intellectual 
property goods, which can reduce firms’ ability to price discriminate.164   
Despite the significant barriers to price discrimination, the practice is fairly common in 
markets for goods protected by intellectual property.165 Examples include the student discounts 
offered by theaters and software distributors,166 and drug companies giving large price-breaks to 
low-income consumers without insurance.167 Although price discrimination rarely eliminates the 
deadweight loss from intellectual property,168 and sometimes it can even be harmful,169 there are 
numerous instances where price discrimination expands access to goods beyond what would be 
available with a single monopoly price.170  
  One  particular  type  of  price  discrimination  that  can  reduce  deadweight  loss  from 
intellectual property, the “two-part tariff,” warrants special attention.  Under a two-part tariff, 
consumers pay the monopolist an upfront fee in exchange for the right to purchase units of the 
good at a specified price.  The classic example of a two-part pricing scheme is Disneyland, where 
                                                 
164 See Fisher, Differential Pricing of Information, supra note , at 13-20; Meurer, supra note , at 83-85. 
 
165  See  Fisher, Differential Pricing of Information,  supra  note , at 4-9 (providing various examples of price 
discrimination in patented  and copyrighted goods); Meurer, supra  note , at 70-75 (offering numerous 
examples of price discrimination . 
 
166 See Meurer, supra note , at 70. 
 
167 See http://www.togetherrxaccess.com (last visited Jul. 1, 2010).  
 
168 Supra note 159.   
 
169 See Fisher, supra note , at 22 (“[I]t is impossible to say, in the abstract, whether price discrimination 
increases or decreases aggregate social welfare.”).  Price discrimination is more likely to be harmful when 
a  firm  only  discriminates  among  high-value  users.  Under  these  circumstances,  as  Michael  Meurer 
explains,  “[h]igh  valuation  buyers  lose  consumer  surplus  because  they  face  a  higher  price,  and  low 
valuation buyers are unaffected because they continue to face the old uniform monopoly price.” Meurer, 
supra note , at 92.   
 
170 See Fisher, supra note , at 2-9. 
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consumers pay an upfront fee to get into the park, but once inside they have access to the 
individual rides for free – a price that approximates the marginal cost of taking a ride.171 Disney 
has a monopoly over each of the rides in Disneyland, but with the two-part tariff, consumers who 
pay the upfront fee enjoy access to those rides at the efficient level.  The entrance fee causes 
deadweight loss as some consumers are priced out of Disneyland, but the consumers inside the 
park completely avoid the deadweight loss normally associated with monopoly pricing.  
  Although  the  intellectual  property  literature  rarely  mentions  this  form  of  price 
discrimination,172 two-part tariffs are a common pricing strategy with patented and copyrighted 
goods.  Online music services like Napster and Rhapsody charge monthly subscription fees for 
unlimited, on-demand access to large collections of songs.173 Universities pay subscription fees to 
various online databases so that their faculty and students can enjoy unfettered access to journal 
articles.174  Consumers pay an upfront fee to their cable company for unlimited viewing of the 
television and movie programming in their bundle.175 Some industry patent pools offer firms free 
or low-cost access to patented technologies in exchange for an upfront fee.176  
                                                 
171 See Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q.J. ECON. 77 
(1971).   
 
172 For an exception, see Duffy, supra note , at 45-46 (noting that “monopolists are free to rely on ‘multi-
part’ pricing, by which lower charges would be made for incremental units”).  
 
173 See www.rhapsody.com; www.napster.com.  
 
174 See Steven Shavell, Should Copyright of Academic Works be Abolished?, at 37 (2009) (forthcoming, Journal of 
Legal Analysis) (“Today, universities subscribe to a large number of journals and make their content freely 
available to many in the university community through library and Internet access … .”).  
 
175 See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and Efficiency of Bundles in New 
Technology Markets, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 32-35 (2009).   
 
176 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note , at 22-24.   
 Draft 
Please do not cite without permission from the author. 
  48 
The  most  noteworthy  example  of  two-part  tariff  pricing  for  a  patented  technology  is 
prescription-drug  insurance.  When  consumers  buy  prescription-drug  insurance,  they  pay  an 
upfront fee (the insurance premium) that enables them to purchase drugs at the price of their co-
payment.  To the extent that co-payments for drugs resemble marginal cost, and they are often 
fairly  close,177  consumers  with  insurance  enjoy  efficient  access  to  prescription  drugs.178  As  a 
result,  the  widespread  use  of  prescription-drug  insurance  in  the  United  States  dramatically 
reduces the deadweight from drug patents.179  
Although  their  benefits  can  be  significant,  two-part  tariffs  are  not  a  cure  for  the 
deadweight loss caused by intellectual property.180  People who fail to pay the upfront fee are 
either excluded from the market or, if they can still purchase the goods individually (like people 
                                                 
177 See Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance as a Two-Part Pricing Contract, NBER Working 
Paper  No.  12681,  at  n.  (Nov.  2006).  Under  the  modern  practice  of  tiered  formularies,  however, 
consumers  often  face  high  co-payments  for  expensive  prescription  drugs  when  there  are  lower-cost 
alternatives. See Jesse D. Malkin et al., The Changing Face of Pharmacy Benefit Design, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 194 
(2004). 
 
178 See Michael Crew, Coinsurance and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 906, 906 
(1969) (“Where monopoly or some restriction of competition exists in the servicing of liability claims, 
coinsurance  may  lead  to  Pareto  optimal  situation.”);  Gaynor  Has-Wilson  &  Vogt  (2000);  Darius 
Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance as a Two-Part Pricing Contract,  NBER  Working  Paper  No. 
12681, at 1 (Nov. 2006) (“Health insurance resembles a two-part pricing contract, in which a group of 
consumers pays an upfront fee in exchange for lower prices in the event of illness. … Marginal cost co-
payments allow a firm to extract the maximum possible consumer surplus, because there is no deadweight 
loss to consumers.”); cf. Alan M. Garber, Charles I. Jones & Paul Romer, Insurance and Incentives for Medical 
Innovation, FORUM FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL., vol. 9, issue 2, art. 4 (2006).   
 
179 See Lakdawalla & Sood, supra note , at 2 (arguing that health insurance can eliminate the deadweight 
loss from patent protection on pharmaceuticals by allowing consumers to purchase drugs at marginal 
cost); see also William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical Perspectives 
12 (2001) (“Public or private health-insurance systems can, of course, offset [the potential deadweight loss 
from high drug prices] by enabling the cost of patented drugs to passed along either to all taxpayers … or 
to large populations of potential patients.”).   
 
180 Cf. Shavell, supra note , at 38 (“Faculty and students [still] do not have ready access to all articles on the 
Internet and often face costly-in-time hurdles to locate what is in theory freely available.”). 
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without prescription-drug insurance), they suffer the normal deadweight loss from a single-price 
monopoly.181   
The  Disneyland  example  helps  to  explain  why,  under  normal  market  conditions, 
deadweight loss persists under a two-part tariff.  By setting the price of the individual rides at 
marginal cost, Disney maximizes the value to consumers of entering the park, which allows it to 
charge an upfront fee that generates higher profit than would be possible if consumers had to 
anything  pay  more  than  marginal  cost  to  take  the  rides.182  If  consumer  demand  were 
homogenous, two-part tariffs would result in a first-best outcome: firms would set their upfront 
fee at the monopoly price, which (by assumption) everyone would pay, and then sell their goods 
to consumers at marginal cost.183  Consumer demand is almost never homogenous, of course, 
and with heterogeneity, monopolists will either set the second part of the tariff above marginal 
cost,  or,  more  commonly,  charge  an  upfront  fee  that  excludes  some  consumers  from  the 
market.184  When the upfront fee is set at the monopoly price, consumers who pay the fee will 
enjoy the efficient level of access to the innovation, but others will still be subject to the inefficient 
single monopoly price or perhaps excluded from the market entirely.  In practice, therefore, two-
part tariffs can only lessen the inefficiencies of monopoly pricing.   
 
B.   EVALUATING THE PRIZE SYSTEM’S POTENTIAL TO OFFER MORE EFFICIENT CONSUMER 
PRICING  
 
                                                 
181  See  Kaiser  Public  Opinion,  Economic  Problems  Facing  Families  3-4  (April  2008)  at 
http://kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7773.pdf. 
 
182 See Oi, supra note , at 81-88.   
 
183 See Oi, supra note , at 81-88; Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 601-610 (fix) (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig, eds. 1989).   
 
184 See Varian, supra note , at ; TIROLE, supra note , at 143-146.   
 Draft 
Please do not cite without permission from the author. 
  50 
Prize advocates argue that abolishing intellectual property will allow for greater price 
competition  in  the  markets  for  innovations,  resulting  in  consumer  prices  that  are  closer  to 
marginal  cost.    This  is  a  sensible  argument,  and  it  is  probably  correct.    Nonetheless,  the 
magnitude of the welfare gains from eliminating intellectual property may be much smaller than 
currently believed. Firms often possess trade secrets and know-how related to their innovations 
that  would  give  them  an  advantage  over  competitors  even  without  intellectual  property.    A 
variety of markets are also affected by other barriers to entry, such as FDA regulations, that will 
continue to insulate innovators from significant price competition.  Even if the prize system did 
somehow lead to perfect competition, any large fixed costs of production would still prevent 
prices  from  reaching  marginal  cost.  Basing  prizes  on  sales  volume  creates  other  problems. 
Governments may find it expedient to impose user fees on innovations – which reintroduce 
deadweight loss – to help fund the prize system and reduce its payments to innovators.  At the 
same time, paying innovators based on sales volume may encourage them to set prices below 
marginal cost to boost their own profits.  These concerns all limit the potential welfare gains from 
using prizes instead of intellectual property to promote innovation.   
1. The argument in support of prizes.—The case for eliminating intellectual property in favor 
of  prizes  is  ultimately  about  the  benefits  of  price  competition.  For  innovations  that  can  be 
reproduced  as  a  digital  file,  eliminating  intellectual  property  would  probably  produce  true 
marginal-cost pricing because of the low costs of copying.  With more tangible goods, the path to 
marginal-cost pricing is more nebulous, but prizes are still expected to move prices nearer the 
optimal.  
The  prize  system  uses  competition  to  push  consumer  prices  closer  to  marginal  cost. 
Without an intellectual property right, innovators would be unable to use the courts to stop 
competitors  from  copying  their  ideas.    Unless  there  is  some  other  barrier  to  imitation, Draft 
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competitors could enter the market and sell goods to consumers that are either close or perfect 
substitutes  of  the  innovation.    The  resulting  price  competition  would  make  it  difficult  for 
innovators to command any premium in the sale of their products. With perfect competition, 
prices would fall to average production costs,185 which the literature generally presumes is close 
or equal to marginal cost.   
A prize system for goods that can be reproduced and distributed as digital files – e.g., 
music, films, books and software – would likely achieve the ideal result of marginal-cost pricing.  
There  are  almost  no  fixed  costs  or  limits  on  production  capacity  in  the  reproduction  and 
dissemination of digital files, and the variable costs are also near zero.  Without the intellectual 
property  system  (or  digital  encryption  technology),  these  goods  could  all  be  posted  on  the 
Internet and downloaded for free.186  Since the marginal cost of reproducing a digital file is 
effectively zero, the market would achieve static efficiency.  
For most other types of goods, a prize system is unlikely to result in perfect competition or 
marginal-cost pricing, although some reduction in price should be expected.  Perfect competition 
is rare for reasons that have little to do with the intellectual property system.187  Indeed, critics of 
intellectual  property  are  the  first  to  note  that  eliminating  patents  and  copyrights  would  not 
                                                 
185  The  term  “average  production  costs”  is  used  here  to  mean  the  total  fixed  and  variable  costs  of 
manufacturing and distributing a good, excluding the upfront R&D costs.  If there are economies to scale 
in manufacturing or distribution, perfect competition will not result in true marginal-cost pricing, but 
rather average cost pricing by firms operating at minimum efficient scales of production.  The literature 
on prizes implicitly assumes that average production costs are equal to marginal costs.  See, e.g., Kremer, 
supra note , at 1154; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 529 & 545; Stiglitz, supra note .   
 
186 See FISHER, supra note . 
 
187 See SCHERER, supra note , at 384  (explaining that “real-world markets are almost never purely and 
perfectly  competitive,”  and  that  even  without  intellectual  property,  innovations  might  not  be  sold  at 
marginal cost because of “natural imitation lags, the advantages of competitive product leadership, and 
the existence of non-patent barriers to the emergence of a competitive market structure”); TIROLE, supra 
note , at .   
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reduce the profits from innovation to zero.188  Nonetheless, a prize system should reduce prices 
even under conditions of monopolistic competition, since the cost of imitation would be lower 
and firms could introduce products that are closer to being perfect substitutes for others on the 
market.  The result will not be perfect static efficiency because prices will not be set at marginal 
cost.  If the elimination of intellectual property reduces product differentiation, however, prices 
should at least move closer to the optimum.   
2. Barriers to entry other than intellectual property.—Any advantage of prizes over intellectual 
property  depends  on  the  introduction  of  price  competition  into  the  market  for  innovations.  
When intellectual property is just one of many barriers to entry in a particular market, the prize 
system  may  fail  to  allow  substantial  price  competition,  and  the  efficiency  gains  in  consumer 
pricing will be modest.  As a result, the benefits from switching to a prize system depend on the 
significance of intellectual property relative to the other barriers to entry in the market.  
Innovators will often possess trade secrets and advantages in know-how related to the use 
of  their  inventions  even  without  intellectual  property.  Despite  the  purported  “disclosure 
function”  of  patents,  firms  frequently  retain  important  information  about  their  patented 
inventions  as  trade  secrets  and  know-how.189  Karl  Jorda,  a  prominent  practitioner  and  law 
professor,  observes  that  “[a]s  a  practical  matter,  licenses  under  patents  without  access  to 
associated  or  collateral  know-how  are  often  not  enough  for  commercial  use  of  the  patented 
technology.”190 If the disclosure of technical information under the prize system is similar to that 
                                                 
188  See,  e.g.,  MICHELE  BOLDRIN  &  DAVID  K.  LEVINE,  AGAINST  INTELLECTUAL  MONOPOLY  67-68 
(2008).   
 
189 See Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2024-25 
(2005) 
 
190 Karl F. Jorda, Intellectual Property Valuation: The Legal Counterpart/Counterpoint, Law Seminars 
International Conference on Mining Patent Portfolios, at 4, Sept. 13, 2004. Jorda continues:  Draft 
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under  patents,  most  firms  will  retain  valuable  trade  secrets  and  know-how  related  to  their 
innovations after they receive a prize.  As long as firms maintain control over that knowledge, 
they  can  use  their  trade  secrets  and  know-how  to  set  the  price  of  their  innovations  above 
marginal cost – although perhaps not to the same extent as when they also had intellectual 
property rights on them.   
The  regulatory  barriers  to  entry  in  certain  industries  could  present  an  even  greater 
impediment to price competition. Government agencies like the FDA and EPA often prohibit 
firms from selling product innovations without first satisfying stringent safety standards.191 For 
manufacturers of vaccines,192 biologic drugs,193 diagnostics and medical devices,194 the regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Hence, data and know-how are immensely important.  In this regard, let me cite the following 
persuasive comments:  
 
•‘In many cases, particularly in chemical technology, the know-how is the most important part of a 
technology transfer agreement.’ (Homer Blair).  
 
•‘Acquire not just the patents but the rights to the know-how. Access to experts and records, lab 
notebooks, and reports on pilot-scale operations, including data on markets and potential users of 
the technology are crucial.’ (Robert Ebish). 
 
•‘It is common practice in industry to seek and obtain patents on that part of a technology that is 
amenable to patent protection, while maintaining related technological data and other information 
in confidence. Some regard a patent as little more than an advertisement for the sale of 
accompanying know-how.’ (Peter Rosenberg). 
 
•In technology licensing ‘related patent rights generally are mentioned late in the discussion and are 
perceived to have ‘insignificant’ value relative to the know-how.’ (Michael Ward, Honeywell VP 
Licensing). 
 
• ‘Trade secrets are a component of almost every technology license...(and) can increase the value of 
a license up to 3 to 10 times the value of the deal if no trade secrets are involved.’ (Melvin Jager). 
 
Id. at 4-5.   
 
191  See  U.S.  CONGRESS,  OFFICE  OF  TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT,  INNOVATION  AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 64-65 (1995).   
 
192 Eileen Salinsky & Cole Werble, The Vaccine Industry: Does It Need a Shot in the Arm?, National Health 
Policy Forum (2006).   Draft 
Please do not cite without permission from the author. 
  54 
approval process dramatically increases the costs of copying other firms’ innovations.195 As a 
result, expiring intellectual property rights often have little effect on prices.196  In other related 
industries, however, including small-molecule drugs,197 agrochemicals198 and food additives,199 
patent expiration can have a dramatic effect on price because competitors are exempt from 
much of the regulatory approval process. 200  
3.  The  fixed  costs  of  production  and  economies  of  scale.—Anytime  there  are  fixed  costs  and 
economies to scale in producing an innovation, the prize system cannot bring about marginal-
cost pricing. The best-case scenario for prizes is a perfectly competitive market. Competitors will 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
193 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, sec. 7001-7003 
 
194 21 U.S.C. § 360e 
 
195 The regulatory approval process for genetically-modified seeds might have this same effect, depending 
on whether firms like Monsanto could prevent farmers from “saving seeds” under a prize system through 
contracting. See Keith T. Atherton, Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Crops, 181 TOXICOLOGY 421 
(2002); Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, Transparency and the Protection of Regulatory 
Data, OECD Joint Meeting, June 2009. 
 
196 See Rachel Glennerster & Michael Kremer, A Better Way to Spur Medical Research and Development, 23 
REGULATION 34, 38 (2000) (“A patent buyout would allow firms to compete freely to manufacture a 
vaccine,  but  given  the  technical  complexity  of  manufacturing  vaccines  and  the  arduous  process  of 
securing regulatory approval, competition might not be intense even if patents were put in the public 
domain.”); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC 
DRUG COMPETITION iii-iv (2009) (concluding that “[t]he substantial costs to obtain FDA approval, plus 
the substantial fixed costs to develop manufacturing capacity, will likely limit the number of competitors 
that undertake entry with [follow-on biologic] products” to just “two to three” on average “to compete 
with a particular pioneer biologic drug”).   
 
197 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 345, 356-59 (2007). 
 
198 See CropLife Int’l, On the Protection of Safety and Efficacy Data for Existing and New Crop Protection Chemicals, 
Jan. 15 2008.  
 
199 See Peter Barton Hutt, Regulation of Food Additives in the United States, in FOOD ADDITIVES 213-14 (A. 
Larry Branen et al., eds. 2d 2002).  
 
200 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 510-
511 (2009).   
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enter and drive down prices,201 but only up to the point where they still expect to recover their 
overall investment.  In addition to the variable costs of producing each unit of the good, these 
firms may have incurred start-up costs when they entered the market (e.g., equipment, facilities, 
training  and  business  licenses),  and  there  may  be  other  fixed  costs  during  production  (e.g., 
overhead  and  salaries  for  non-hourly  workers).    Since  firms  must  expect  a  return  on  these 
investments, entry will occur until prices fall to the average total costs of the marginal entering 
firm. Marginal-cost pricing, on the other hand, would reflect only the difference in variable costs 
with the production of each addition unit of the innovation. Whenever there are fixed costs in 
production  or  economies  of  scale,  therefore,  the  prize  system  cannot  achieve  marginal  cost 
pricing.  
This observation is more pertinent to some technologies than others. There are no real 
fixed costs associated with online file sharing of music and books, and so marginal costs and 
average total production costs are about the same. In contrast, due to the immense fixed costs of 
producing vaccines and biologic drugs,202 the “generic” price of those drugs under a prize system 
could be much higher than their marginal cost. The case for the prize system is stronger for 
                                                 
201  It  is  possible  that  eliminating  intellectual  property  would  spur  innovation  in  production  processes, 
ultimately  lowering  the  marginal  costs  of  production  over  time.    In  a  market  with  limited  product 
differentiation and increased price competition, there might be additional pressure on firms to lower their 
production costs, perhaps resulting in more innovation that, over time, reduces average production costs. 
Cf.  Kenneth  Arrow,  Economic  Welfare  and  the  Allocation  of  Resources  for  Invention,  in  THE  RATE  AND 
DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 609 (Richard R. Nelson ed. 1962). But see Edmund Kitch, The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (arguing that compared to competition, a 
monopolist  that  is  able  to  coordinate  the  development  of  an  invention  will  invest  optimally  in  that 
development effort); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 101 (3d ed. 
1950) (hypothesizing that if price competition is too intense, firms will have inadequate resources for R&D 
investments).  Lower  manufacturing  and  distribution  costs  would  also  increase  the  social  and  private 
returns from product innovations, boosting the incentive for those R&D investments as well. See John A. 
Vernon et al., Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Efficiency, Drug Prices, and Public Health: Examining the Causal Links, 
41 DRUG INFORMATION J. _ (2007). 
 
202 See supra note 196.   
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small-molecule drugs, but even there, prices will not fall to marginal cost. For most brand-name 
small-molecule drugs, the cost of goods sold is roughly 20 to 30 percent of their gross sales 
receipts.  Much of these costs are fixed, such as building the manufacturing facilities and having 
them certified by regulators.203 Generic manufacturers face similar fixed costs in their production 
process.204  Assuming perfect competition in the absence of intellectual property, prices should 
fall to the total average cost of generic manufacturers, not their marginal cost of producing each 
pill.  Given the large fixed costs of manufacturing drugs, the generic price for a drug might be 
noticeably higher than its marginal cost.   
4. Reinstating deadweight loss through user fees on innovations.—When the government calculates 
prize payouts based on sales volume, there is a danger that it try to save money by imposing a 
sales tax on innovations that reintroduces deadweight loss. Most proposals for prize systems rely 
on observations of sales volume to calculate prizes.205  Given the close connection between the 
utilization of an innovation and its social value, it is hard to imagine a comprehensive prize 
system  that  does  anything  else.206  Unfortunately,  basing  rewards  on  sales  volume  gives  the 
                                                 
203 See Pradeep Suresh & Prabir K. Basu, Improving Pharmaceutical Product Development and Manufacturing: Impact 
on Cost of Drug Development and Cost of Goods Sold of Pharmaceuticals, 3 J. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 175 
(2008); Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharmaceutical Companies, 3 J. PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION 30 (2008).  
 
204 See Basu et al., supra note .  
 
205 See, e.g., Chari et al., supra note ; FISHER, supra note , at 224; Grinols & Henderson, supra note ; HOLLIS 
& POGGE, supra note , at 29-31; Love & Hubbard, supra note , at 1532; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 
, at 540-542.  
 
206 In theory, the government could set prize payouts based on predicted utilization rates rather than ex 
post sales figures. Michael Kremer’s proposal for patent buyouts is an example, since he would have the 
government valuate patents through an auction that elicits information about expected monopoly profits.  
Kremer, supra note , at 1146-1148.  However, he also acknowledges that the government might need to 
use observed sales figures to ensure that it does not overpay for patents. Kremer, supra note , at 1159-
1160.  
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government a perverse incentive to suppress utilization as a way to reduce its own liabilities.207 
The government could use a variety of different policy levers for this purpose,208 but the most 
direct is to impose user fees on innovations to inflate their price, thereby suppressing sales volume 
while also raising money to help finance the prize system.209 From the public’s perspective, these 
user fees are harmful because they undermine some (or all) of the efficiency gains from the prize 
system.  Nevertheless,  so  long  as  the  government  is  operating  under  budget  constraints  and 
calculates prizes based on sales volume, it will have a strong incentive to suppress the utilization 
of innovations though a sales tax or something similar.  
  5. The potential for innovators to set prices below marginal cost.—While the government has an 
incentive to raise prices above marginal cost under the prize system, innovators will sometimes 
have an incentive to do the exact opposite.  Linking prize payouts to sales volume can, under the 
right  circumstances,  make  it  profitable  for  firms  to  sell  their  innovations  at  a  price  below 
marginal cost (or engage in excessive marketing), since the resulting increase in sales would boost 
                                                 
207 Cf. William P. Rogerson, Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
65, 81 (1994) (“even if the government could find some way to commit more strongly to treating sunk 
investment expenses as reimbursable costs when it decides to purchase weapons, such a policy would still 
exhibit a significant problem. If the regulations worked perfectly, and military services felt completely 
obligated to negotiate prices which included payments for sunk assets, then the military service must pay 
these costs if it purchases the weapon, but can avoid them if it does not purchase the weapon.  To put it 
another way, the military services will view sunk costs as variable, leading to inefficient behavior.”).  
 
208 Governments with national health insurance systems use a variety of techniques to control the use of 
prescription  drugs  to  fit  within  the  system’s  budgetary  constraints,  including  restrictive  formularies, 
prescribing guidelines, prescribing budgets for physicians or hospitals, and marketing restrictions. See U.S. 
DEPARTMENT  OF  COMMERCE,  PHARMACEUTICAL  PRICE  CONTROLS  IN  OECD  COUNTRIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND INNOVATION 7-
9 (2004).   
 
209 Cf. Sarah Thomson & Elias Mossialos, Influencing Demand for Drugs Through Cost Sharing, in REGULATING 
PHARMACEUTICALS  IN EUROPE: STRIVING  FOR EFFICIENCY, EQUITY  AND QUALITY 227-244 (Elias 
Mossialos et al. eds. 2004) (describing the use of co-payments and other cost-sharing  mechanisms  in 
OECD countries to reduce government spending on prescription drugs).   
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their prize receipts.210 If they do, consumption would be excessive, and the asserted superiority of 
prizes over intellectual property in static efficiency might be called into question. Moreover, these 
strategies  will  corrupt  the  reliability  of  sales-volume  data  as  a  signal  of  the  social  value  of 
innovations, making it harder for the government to construct a trustworthy mechanism to set 
prize payouts.211  
The government’s response to this problem could have a significant effect on the benefits 
of switching to a prize system.  One way to prevent innovators from selling their goods at a price 
below marginal cost is to prohibit them from manufacturing it.  This policy, however, might not 
be  practical  in  industries  where  R&D  and  manufacturing  investments  are  intertwined. 
Additionally, if innovators are forbidden to manufacture their goods, the government will still 
need  to  prevent  them  from  secretly  paying  the  manufacturers  to  lower  their  prices  or  from 
subsidizing  consumer  purchases.  An  alternative  strategy  is  for  the  government  to  prohibit 
innovators  from  pricing  below  marginal  cost,  and  use  the  prices  set  by  competitors  as  the 
measure of marginal cost.  In essence, the government would prohibit innovators from charging 
a  lower  price  than  their  competitors.  This  approach  does  not  work  well,  however,  when 
innovators have an advantage over their competitors – such as trade secrecy and know-how – 
that  make  them  the  most  efficient  producers.  Also,  the  government  would  need  to  prevent 
innovators  from  colluding  with  one  of  their  competitors  to  set  prices  below  marginal  cost.  
Nonetheless, this price-regulation strategy is the more promising of the two.   
                                                 
210 See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note , at 34; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 540 n.35.  
 
211 See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 708 (2005) (noting that 
under a prize system for music where prizes are based on download counts, “[f]ans are able to abuse the 
system by repeatedly downloading songs of their favorite artists or by inflating download counts using 
‘ballot-stuffing’ programs or mistaken identities.”). 
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If the government cannot find a practical way to prevent innovators from pricing below 
marginal cost, the prize literature notes that the government might need to intervene and try to 
set prices at marginal cost directly.212  Once the government imposes price controls, however, the 
prize system is no longer utilizing competition to drive prices toward marginal cost.  At that 
point, it is unclear what purpose would be served by eliminating intellectual property rights.213   
  6.  Conclusion.—Taking  these  considerations  into  account,  it  is  no  longer  certain  that 
consumer prices under a prize system will be superior to the normal monopoly pricing strategies 
that  intellectual-property  holders  use.  If  innovators  are  practicing  an  efficient  form  of  price 
discrimination under the intellectual property system, it is possible that a prize system could make 
things worse: either by financing the prize payouts with a sales tax that causes more distortion 
than  the  monopolists’  pricing  schemes,  or  by  encouraging  innovators  to  price  goods  below 
marginal cost. The other limitations to marginal-cost pricing under a prize system, including 
barriers to entry besides intellectual property and the fixed costs of production, simply limit the 
potential for gains from eliminating intellectual property. 
 
C.   ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRIZE SYSTEM: USING PRICE CONTROLS OR SUBSIDIES TO SET 
CONSUMER PRICES AT MARGINAL COST 
 
                                                 
212 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note , at 540 n.35 (“The government could prevent such strategic 
increases in [quantity sold] by forbidding the innovator from selling below the competitive price … .”); 
HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note , at 16 (proposing that the government set consumer prices to approximate 
marginal cost because otherwise an innovator “might give the product away in the hopes of increasing its 
reward”).   
 
213 Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge’s “Health Impact Fund” appears to be the only proposal in the prize 
literature to explicitly call for the government to try to set prices at marginal cost, and not surprisingly, it 
also  dropped  the  requirement  that  firms  give  up  their  intellectual  property  rights  in  exchange  the 
government payment.  HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note , at 16.  In other words, their proposal ceased to be a 
prize system – at least so far as prizes are defined as an alternative to intellectual property.    
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In light of the prize system’s limitations, it is important to compare prizes with other 
policy levers that might reduce deadweight loss without eliminating intellectual property. While 
the  prize  system  relies  on  price  competition  to  push  prices  closer  to  marginal  cost,  the 
government  could  also  intervene  directly  by  using  price  controls  or  subsidizing  consumer 
purchases. When the government can observe marginal costs, as it can with music and books 
downloaded  from  the  Internet,  it  could  use  these  tools  to  achieve  efficient  pricing  without 
needing to abolish intellectual property. Observing marginal cost is much harder for innovations 
that  are  produced  and  distributed  in  physical  form,  which  strengthens  the  case  for  prizes.  
Nonetheless,  for  products  like  vaccines  and  biologic  drugs,  where  eliminating  intellectual 
property will only have a modest effect on prices, prices controls or subsidies may be the only 
way to significantly improve static efficiency.  Additionally, the government may prefer price 
controls or subsidies to prizes as a way to prevent innovators from pricing their goods below 
marginal cost.  Preserving intellectual property could also restrain the government from grossly 
under-compensating innovators by giving them leverage in their negotiations with government 
officials  over  their  reward.  These  considerations  may  help  explain  why  governments  often 
continue  to  use  the  intellectual  property  system  even  when  they  control  the  reward  for 
innovation.    
Replacing intellectual property with prizes is not the only way to move consumer prices 
closer to marginal cost. Much of the prize literature automatically equates intellectual property 
with monopoly pricing.214 This is a mistake.  Intellectual property gives innovators the exclusive 
right to make, use and sell their creations, which provides them with market power to set prices.  
                                                 
214 See supra note .   
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This market power does not provide innovations with a right to set prices.  The government can 
always intervene in the market to control the price of innovations.  
One alternative to replacing intellectual property with prizes is for the government to use 
price controls to attempt setting consumer prices directly at marginal cost. Used in combination 
with reward payments – no different from prize payouts – to compensate innovators for the loss 
of their monopoly profits, these price controls would provide consumers access to innovations at 
marginal cost without jeopardizing the incentives for innovation, or at least, no more so than the 
prize system.215 In most developed countries, governments use this approach to provide their 
citizens with access to prescription drugs.  Under auspices of their national health care systems, 
these governments set consumer prices for drugs at a specified co-payment, and then they pay 
pharmaceutical companies based on sales volume at a negotiated reimbursement rate.216 Their 
reimbursement  systems  effectively  control  the  reward  for  pharmaceutical  innovation,  and 
therefore closely resemble many of the scholarly proposals for determining rewards under a prize 
system.217 Nonetheless, these governments have retained their intellectual property system and 
                                                 
215 See Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation, supra note , at 12 (noting that “[p]ublic or private health-
insurance systems can, of course, offset [the potential deadweight loss from high drug prices] by enabling 
the cost of patented drugs to passed along either to all taxpayers (in which case the exercise of intellectual-
property rights begins to resemble government rewards for innovative activity) or to large populations of 
potential patients”). 
 
216  See  Livio  Garattini  et  al.,  Pricing  and  Reimbursement  of  In-Patent  Drugs  in  Seven  European  Countries:  A 
Comparative Analysis, 82 HEALTH POL. 330 (2007); Brian Godman et al., Having Your Cake and Eating It: Office 
of  Fair  Trading  Proposal  for  Funding  New  Drugs  to  Benefit  Patients  and  Innovative  Companies,  26 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 91 (2008); David A. Henry et al., Drug Prices and Value for Money: The Australian 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 294 JAMA 2630 (2005); Elias Mossialos et al., Pharmaceutical Pricing in 
Europe: Weighing Up the Options, 59 Int’l Soc. Security Rev. 3, 9-10 (2006).   
 
217 In the debate about whether to replace drug patents with prizes, several scholars have noted that 
calculating prize payouts is no different from setting the reimbursement rate under a government-run 
insurance system. See, e.g., Love & Hubbard, supra note , at 1541; Hollis, supra note , at 2.   
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set consumer prices directly through price controls instead of allowing competition to reduce 
prices.   
Another possibility is for the government to subsidize the purchase price of innovations so 
that  consumers’  out-of-pocket  costs  are  much  closer  to  marginal  costs.218  Economists  have 
discussed the possibility of subsidizing public utilities to induce marginal-cost pricing since the 
1930s.219  Applied to innovation, these proposals would call for the government to pay firms for 
each sale of their patented or copyrighted product, encouraging them to lower prices as a way to 
increase  sales  and  collect  additional  subsidies.    If  calibrated  correctly,  those  subsidies  would 
induce  firms  to  set  prices  at  marginal  cost.    Since  the  subsidies  would  also  drive  up  the 
innovators’ profits, perhaps producing excessive incentives for innovation, the government might 
need to levy a lump-sum tax on innovators to offset some of their gains.220 Alternatively, it could 
avoid any need for a lump-sum tax if, as Doug Lichtman proposes, the government targets its 
subsidies at consumer purchases that monopoly pricing would otherwise prevent.221 Consumer 
                                                 
218 Doug Lichtman and Jordan Barry have both discussed the possibility of using subsidies instead of a 
prize system to reduce the deadweight loss caused by intellectual property.  See Lichtman, supra note 
(arguing that the government should subsidize the purchase of prescription drugs for consumers who 
would otherwise be pushed out of the market by monopoly pricing); Barry, supra note , at 609-19 (arguing 
that consumer subsidies are not a viable alternative to a prize system that eliminates intellectual property 
rights). 
 
219 See R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169, 169-70 (1946); Mark Armstrong & 
David  E.M.  Sappington,  Recent  Developments  in  the  Theory  of  Regulation,  3  HANDBOOK  OF  INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1562-65 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter, eds. 2007).   
 
220 See Barry, supra note , at 609-14.   
 
221 See Lichtman, supra note .   
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tax  credits  for  energy-efficient  technology222  and  government  subsidies  for  prescription-drug 
insurance223 are both examples of using subsidies to reduce the price of innovations.  
Assuming  that  the  government  can  observe  the  marginal  costs  of  producing  an 
innovation, direct price controls and consumer subsidies will often be superior to the prize system 
as  a  means  to  marginal-cost  prices.  Under  the  prize  system,  there  are  a  variety  of  market 
conditions  that  will  prevent  prices  from  falling  to  marginal  cost,  including  innovators’  trade 
secrets and know-how, regulatory barriers to entry and the fixed costs of production.224  If the 
government can observe marginal cost, it could set prices there with either price controls or 
subsidies.  Both strategies would avoid the pricing inefficiencies permitted by prizes. In markets 
where the prize system would result in perfect marginal-cost pricing, prizes would be equivalent 
to government price controls or consumer subsidies, but no better.   
These conclusions are based on a rather heroic assumption, since it is often very hard to 
observe marginal costs as a regulator.225 There are a few places where marginal cost is easy to 
observe, such as online file sharing of music and books – where marginal cost is essentially zero.  
Under these limited circumstances, government price controls and subsidies match the efficiency 
                                                 
222  See,  e.g.,  U.S.  Department  of  Energy,  Consumer  Energy  Tax  Incentives,  at 
http://www.energy.gov/taxbreaks.htm  (listing  the  various  tax  credits  available  for  energy-efficient 
technologies under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).  
 
223 See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note , at 488 (“The underconsumption produced by patents for this 
uninsured population, however, can be remedied by taking the much less radical step of insuring the 
uninsured (at co-payments or co-insurance rates that approximate marginal production costs), rather than 
replacing  patents  and  their  market  exclusivities  with  prize  funds  …  .”);  Rai,  supra  note  ,  at  179 
(“[S]ubsidies directed at providing insurance for the uninsured could eliminate deadweight loss by giving 
all individuals the benefit of this price discrimination.  Moreover, as contrasted with buyouts, … subsidies 
directed at providing insurance to the uninsured would require a relatively small commitment of tax 
revenue.”).  
 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 189-204.   
 
225 See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market 
Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 5 (1992).    
 Draft 
Please do not cite without permission from the author. 
  64 
of prizes, since all three systems would – if implemented properly – result in perfect marginal-cost 
pricing.  Most innovations must be manufactured and distributed in a physical form, which 
makes it much more difficult to measure marginal costs.226 The government might try to use 
expert engineering assessments, solicit quotations from other manufacturers, or perhaps even 
audit the innovator’s own cost figures.227 All three approaches would be expensive, and in many 
cases might be unreliable.  
The case for the prize system is stronger when the government cannot reliably measure 
marginal costs, but it is still not absolute. The prize system sets prices through the market, relying 
on increased price competition to push prices closer to marginal cost, and markets are usually 
better  than  the  government  at  setting  prices.    The  prize  system  might  avoid  a  variety  of 
pathologies that often afflict government price controls.228  On the other hand, the market price 
of some innovations under the prize system will be very different from their marginal costs.  
Remaining barriers to entry, fixed costs of production, and strategic pricing by innovators may 
leave  a  lot  of  room  for  improvement.  It  is  possible  that  even  with  limited  information,  the 
government  could  set  prices  closer  to  marginal  cost  than  the  results  of  increased  price 
competition through eliminating intellectual property. In the market for vaccines and biologic 
drugs, for example, where the regulatory barriers to entry will block most competition, price 
controls or subsidies might be the only way to meaningfully improve static efficiency.229  
                                                 
226 See Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1088 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell eds. 2007) (“Marginal cost … may be more difficult to measure, due 
both to the difficulties in identifying which costs are variable (and over what time period) and to the 
presence of common costs that may be difficult to allocate appropriately.  In part for this reason, the 
empirical industrial organization literature … often treats marginal cost as unobservable.”).   
 
227 See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note , at 16.  
 
228 See Anne O. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 9 (1990).   
 
229 See supra note and text accompanying note 196.   Draft 
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There might be other reasons to prefer price controls or subsidies to the prize system.  If 
the government cannot prevent innovators from manipulating consumer prices to boost their 
prize  payouts,  it  may  have  no  choice  but  to  set  prices  directly.230  Alternatively,  once  the 
government has control over the rewards for innovation, maintaining the intellectual property 
system  might  be  the  best  way  to  prevent  it  from  underpaying  firms  for  their  innovations.  
Although their R&D investments are sunk when they negotiate for their reward, if firms can deny 
the  public  access  to  their  innovations,  then  they  still  have  some  leverage  over  government 
officials. If other manufacturers can step in to supply the good, innovators must rely entirely on 
the government’s good graces for their compensation.  
Finally, when the cost of an innovation is partially covered by government-run insurance, 
as is often true with drugs, diagnostics and medical devices, the government may prefer price 
controls over prizes because of the nature of insurance. Although marginal-cost pricing allows for 
efficient consumer access to innovations, there are reasons why the optimal co-payment under an 
insurance  plan  might  differ  from  marginal  cost.    Consumers  could  prefer  to  pay  less  than 
marginal  cost  to  offset  the  loss  from  an  adverse  health  event,  or  above  marginal  cost  to 
discourage  unnecessary  consumption  due  to  moral  hazard.    Given  the  various  cross-price 
elasticities between drugs, diagnostics, medical devises and medical services, optimal co-payments 
will frequently differ from marginal cost.231 Under these circumstances, where a public insurer 
controls consumer prices through a co-payment schedule and does not set them at marginal cost, 
government price controls may be inevitable.  
                                                                                                                                                           
 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 210-213.   
 
231 See Dana Goldman & Tomas J. Philipson, Integrated Insurance Design in the Presence of Multiple Medical 
Technologies, AM. ECON. REV. 2007.   
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  Although competition is generally superior to government price controls or large-scale 
subsidies, they may be reasonable alternatives to the prize system under certain circumstances. 
Scholars should not assume that if the government is setting the reward for innovations, prizes 
are always preferable to intellectual property.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  The prize literature mostly ignores the question of how best to set prices at marginal cost.  
Although prizes will push prices closer to marginal cost in most instances, for many inventions 
the change might be modest.  With respect to pharmaceutical innovation, the focal point for 
most modern scholarship on prize systems, it is unclear whether the prizes are actually superior 
to a system of intellectual property combined with price controls and payments to innovators.  
For  goods  available  that  are  available  for  download  on  the  Internet,  where  the  government 
knows that the marginal cost is zero, the difference between prizes and intellectual property with 
government price controls would seem to be insignificant.   
The  existing  literature  on  prizes  conflates  two  distinct  questions  in  its  comparison  of 
prizes with intellectual property.  The consensus view is that if the government can observe the 
social value of innovations, it should grant prizes instead of intellectual property because the 
public would receive the same benefits of innovation without the deadweight loss from higher 
consumer prices.  This view assumes that the only way to achieve marginal-cost pricing is to 
eliminate intellectual property, which is not always true. Assuming that the government can 
observe the social value of innovations, it might want to eliminate intellectual property rights, but 
it might also want to issue those rights along with supplemental prizes and price controls or 
consumer subsidies.  The comparison between the two approaches depends on which is more 
likely to result in marginal-cost pricing.  The existing literature on prizes addresses a different Draft 
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question: whether (or how) the government could observe enough information about innovations 
to offer a reward without subjecting the public to monopoly pricing.  The answer to that question 
is important regardless of whether the government can eliminate intellectual property rights – 
which might be politically infeasible or forbidden under TRIPS.  